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REFORMING DIVORCE REFORM
Allen M. Parkman*
I. INTRODUCTION
For most of the history of the United States, it was
difficult to dissolve a marriage because plaintiffs had to prove
that their spouses had committed acts that constituted fault
grounds for divorce. These grounds usually consisted of
adultery, desertion, or cruelty. After World War II,
frustrations with these fault grounds led to a reform
movement that eventually changed the grounds for divorce in
all the states. Between 1970 and 1985, all the states either
replaced fault grounds with no-fault grounds of irretrievable
breakdown or incompatibility, or added no-fault grounds to
their existing statutes.
The optimism associated with the shift in divorce
grounds has been moderated by the eventual recognition of
their subtle, but perverse, repercussions. First, it was noted
that many divorced women and their children were worse off
due to the new legal environment.1 More recently, concerns
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1. See Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and
Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1169 (1974) (describing state policies imposing
standardized rules on all marriages are outdated); see also Lenore J. Weitzman
& Ruth B. Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make A Difference?,
14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 143-44 (1980) (finding that a small percentage of final
California divorce decrees included alimony); Lenore J. Weitzman, The
Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony
and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181 (1981) [hereinafter
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce] (arguing that the introduction of no-fault
divorce in California led to a deterioration in the awards to women at divorce);
Ruth B. Dixon & Lenore J. Weitzman, When Husbands File for Divorce, 44 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 103 (1982) (explaining that the percentage of divorces filed
by husbands increased after California introduced no-fault divorce); LENORE J.
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about the effect of no-fault divorce on other members of
society, especially members of intact families, have arisen
because no-fault divorce creates incentives for many adults to
focus more on their own self-interest and less on that of their
family.2 No-fault divorce has had this effect because it
usually permits either spouse to obtain a divorce unilaterally,
seldom providing adequate compensation to the spouses for
their costs resulting from the divorce and to the children for
any deterioration in their quality of life. These costs can be
financial as well as psychological. Financial costs occur when
spouses' future income has decreased because they have made
sacrifices for their family's benefit during marriage, such as
assuming childcare responsibilities or making career
concessions.'
Psychological costs follow from the realization that one's
love is no longer being reciprocated. Faced with these higher
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA
[hereinafter WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION] (1985) (expanding
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra).
2. See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY: NO-FAULT
DIVORCE AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2000) [hereinafter PARKMAN, GOOD
INTENTIONS]. It has been argued that no-fault divorce created incentives for
both spouses to work full-time outside the home, even when those choices
reduce the welfare of the family. See Allen M. Parkman, Why Are Married
Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 41 (1998) [hereinafter
Parkman, Married Women] (describing how no-fault divorce is shown to cause
married women to work longer hours); Allen M. Parkman, Unilateral Divorce
and the Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women, Revisited, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 671 (1992) (showing how no-fault divorce causes married women to
increase their work outside the home). Although not attributing the change to
no-fault divorce, others have observed that married women have been working
more hours at a job and in the home in the period since no-fault divorce was
introduced. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY
78 (1988). Other commentators have criticized the current state of marriage
noting that liberation and self-fulfillment have imposed a substantial cost on
others, especially children. These authors frequently see the problem as being a
shift in values and, therefore, they do not see no-fault divorce as being at the
core of the problem. See BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE
(1997) (showing how the nation's 30-year experiment with divorce has created a
low-commitment culture full of broken families and shattered lives); MAGGIE
GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE
(1996) (showing the devastating effects a broken marriage has on everyone it
touches with the government contributing to its decline).
3. See Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial
Arrangements at Divorce, 87 KY. L.J. 51 (1998-99) (describing how these
sacrifices should be viewed as creating debts for which compensation is
appropriate at divorce).
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costs from divorce, it is no surprise that spouses have
responded by reducing their commitment to marriage,
frequently to the detriment of their families. Moreover,
children are usually innocent bystanders to this process, but
they are frequently worse off after divorce than they would
have been if the marriage had continued.'
Responding to these concerns, there have been proposals
for reforming the earlier divorce reforms that would make it
more difficult for a couple to divorce.5 Any new reforms,
however, will have only a limited effect on the perverse
incentives created by no-fault divorce. This is because
spouses frequently have little control over the grounds for
divorce that will be applied to their marriage, and must
therefore be concerned about a no-fault divorce even though
they were either married, or are living, in a state in which
divorce is more difficult. The law of the domicile of either
spouse controls the grounds for divorce at the time of divorce
rather than the law of the state in which the couple was
married or the one in which they may have lived during most
of the marriage.6 Consequently, a spouse who established
domicile in a state with no-fault grounds for divorce could
divorce a spouse who was married and living in a state in
which divorce was difficult. A divorce can occur in a state in
which a spouse has never lived because the courts treat
4. It is almost universally recognized that children are better off in a
smoothly functioning two parent household, rather than with divorced parents.
See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL & LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 294 (1992). Whether children on
average are better off with two parents than one is controversial and often
depends on how traumatic divorce is for the children. Some find the adjustment
to be fairly smooth. See id. Others conclude that divorce has left numerous
children worse off and the adverse effects continue for many years. See JUDITH
S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKELEE, SECOND CHANCE: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE xv (1990).
5. See Elizabeth Schoenfeld, Drumbeats for Divorce Reform, 77 POLY REV.
8 (1996) (summarizing current proposals); David M. Wagner, Divorce Reform:
New Directions, 400 CURRENT 7 (1998) (considering proposals including the
complete privatization of marriage law); Jennifer Warren, No-fault Divorce
Under Fire in State, Nation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at Al (discussing three
divorce options for California).
6. In most states, residency and domicile are treated similarly. While a
few states have no durational requirement for filing for divorce but require only
a bona fide residency or domicile, most states additionally impose a durational
requirement ranging from six weeks to one year. Six months is the most
common durational requirement for a divorce. See JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET
AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 193 (1993).
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marriage as a status, giving the state in which either spouse
is domiciled jurisdiction over a divorce.7 These decisions
usually have to be honored in all other states, including the
domicile of the other spouse, under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.8
This article makes a proposal for reforming earlier
divorce reforms that resulted in no-fault divorce, arguing that
a combination of no-fault, mutual consent, and fault grounds
for divorce will improve the incentives that spouses face, and
will provide substantial improvements for them and their
children. Although marriage has become less attractive for
some adults,9 a large majority of adults still want to marry."
For these people, there are benefits from a long-term
commitment that would be encouraged by the reforms
proposed here, especially when the couple desires children.
For these reforms to be effective, however, marriage can no
longer be treated as a status, but instead must be recognized
as a contract." Subject to government regulations, especially
7. While the state in which either spouse is domiciled has jurisdiction to
grant a divorce, the financial aspects of marriage require personal jurisdiction
over both spouses. See id. at 201.
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. (The full text of this section is: "Full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state.").
9. Economists argue that in addition to romance, love, and sexual
attraction, marriage also has a pragmatic foundation based on the gains that
men and women have experienced from additional specialization within a
relationship. The convergence in the opportunities available to men and women
has reduced the opportunities for these gains from specialization and, therefore,
the gains from marriage. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY (1991).
10. All the relevant data show that adults of all ages say that having a
"happy marriage" is one of their most important life goals. For example, in
1992, when high school seniors were asked to rate life goals as part of the
Monitoring the Future Project of the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan, "having a good family and family life" was the top
ranked goal. See Norval D. Glenn, Values, Attitudes, and the State of American
Marriage, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA 21 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996).
11. There is a long history of authors discussing marriage as a contract.
See, e.g., Richard W. Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It by Contract?, 67
GEO. L.J. 1131, 1134 (1979) (proposing a model statutory framework that would
permit couples to elect a community property arrangement for their marriage);
Lloyd Cohen, Marriage as Contract, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 618 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Theodore F. Haas,
The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66
N.C. L. REV. 879, 894 (1988) (proposing model ante-nuptial agreements that
impose financial burdens for initiating divorce); Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda
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to protect children, treating marriage as a contract that
includes the grounds for dissolution would base divorce on the
agreement entered into at marriage rather than the domicile
at dissolution.12 This agreement, like all contracts, would not
change as either spouse moved from state to state or even
abroad.
The next section discusses the impetus for, and the
impact of, no-fault divorce. Section III presents the reform
efforts to date, while Section IV cautions that these reforms
will have only a limited effect. Section V then presents a
reform program based on contract principles that would bring
more predictability to marriage.
II. DIVORCE REFORM
By making marriage terminable at will, and often subject
to limited compensation for the divorced spouse and any
children, no-fault divorce has had a perverse impact on many
people. This was not the intent or the anticipated effect of
reforming divorce laws. In 1969, California adopted the first
unequivocal no-fault divorce statute in the United States. 3
C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974) (discussing partnership
agreements between husbands and wives); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the
Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91 (1993)
(arguing for mutual consent to be the normal ground for divorce); Eric
Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998) (stating that the current state
laws do not fit all marriages); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering
of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982) (arguing
the utility of marriage contracts to govern human interactions); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9
(1990) (discussing the use of precommitment strategies, including ante nuptial
contracts, to lower divorce rates); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts
and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65 (1998) (describing how the
courts only enforce the monetary aspects of marriage contracts); Carol
Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic
Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777 (1994) (stating how everything can be
discussed in contract terms); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998)
(discussing the need for men and women to bargain as equals).
12. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 11, at 500 (describing the
importance of marriage being a contract to overcome the problems associated
with it being a status).
13. See Family Law Act, ch. 1608, §§ 1-32, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312. The first
"pure" no-fault statute was enacted in California in 1969. See Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987) (The California statute has been described as "pure"
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Over the following fifteen years, all the other states and the
District of Columbia enacted similar statutes establishing
"irretrievable breakdown" or "incompatibility" as the only
grounds for divorce or adding them to preexisting fault
grounds. 14  The new laws were viewed as a major, and
desirable, reform of the statutes in effect throughout most of
the history of the United States. 5 Under these old statutes, a
divorce, when permitted at all, usually could only be obtained
on fault grounds such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion."
Increasingly, spouses began perjuring themselves with
fabricated testimony to establish these grounds when the
marriage had failed for other reasons.17  Many no-fault
because it based divorce exclusively on the factual breakdown of the marriage).
Prior to 1969, some states included no-fault grounds with their fault grounds for
divorce. For example, incompatibility as a ground for divorce was introduced
into the United States when it acquired the Virgin Islands from Denmark in
1917 with it subsequently being adopted by some states. See Graham
Kirkpatrick, Incompatibility as a Ground for Divorce, 47 MARQ. L. REV. 453
(1964) (describing how incompatibility was used as a ground for divorce in New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Alaska). Other states had "no-fault" grounds for
divorce, such as voluntary separation for a period of time, or incurable insanity;
by the mid-1960s 18 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia permitted
a divorce based on the parties living apart. See GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 162 (1991). By 1985, all the states had some form of no-
fault divorce, either exclusively no-fault grounds or with no-fault grounds added
to the fault grounds. See Linda D. Elrod et al., A Review of the Year in Family
Law: Children's Issues Dominate, 32 FAM. L.Q. 661 (Winter 1999) (providing
data on the current status of divorce laws).
14. The states rapidly enacted no-fault divorce statutes. Iowa passed its no-
fault divorce statute in 1971. By August 1977, only three states retained
essentially fault grounds for divorce. See Doris J. Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr.,
Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297 (1977). More than
no-fault, the important characteristic of the new laws was that they permitted
one spouse to obtain a divorce even when the other spouse opposed it. Today
only four states (Mississippi, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee) require mutual
consent for a no-fault divorce. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman,
Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1277 n.24 (1996)
(discussing whether a tort action for spousal emotional abuse should be
allowed).
15. See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law,
75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 297 (1987) (showing how the fault divorce laws were in
conflict with the reality that divorce was commonly permitted based on mutual
consent); see also WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION supra note 1, at 51
(explaining how the divorce reforms were embraced with a pioneering zeal).
16. Although much of American law came almost directly from England, our
history of divorce differs substantially from that in England. There were no
judicial divorces in England until 1857, while many colonies and state courts
could grant divorces from an early time. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179, 434 (1973).
17. See Kay, supra note 15, at 299 (stating that a major goal and an
REFORMING DIVORCE REFORM
divorce statutes removed the consideration of marital fault
from the grounds for divorce, the award of spousal support,
and the division of property.18
A Impetus for Change
An initial question is why there was pressure for such a
dramatic change in divorce laws. The shift from fault to no-
fault divorce was initially motivated by the change in
circumstances facing some American adults that reduced the
attraction and stability of marriage for them. While marriage
has always had a romantic foundation in the United States, 9
it also has pragmatic considerations because couples could
improve their quality of life by living together compared to
staying single. This occurred because gains that resulted
from increased specialization increased their welfare and that
of their family.2" An example of this specialization is child
rearing, which can have little market value. Marriage
became a long-term commitment to encourage such activities.
In the colonial era, this specialization generally occurred on
farms. With the industrial revolution, the increase in
employment opportunities for men resulted in their
specializing in income earning, while wives specialized in
domestic activities.
Changing conditions reduced the gains from
specialization as the opportunities available to men and
women converged. Employment opportunities for women
increased, reducing their dependence on men for income.2
Meanwhile, labor-saving devices became more readily
available for the home, reducing men's dependence on
enduring achievement of the reforms was the elimination of hypocrisy and
perjury from divorce proceedings). The most usual fabricated ground was
cruelty. See id.
18. See Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Family Law in the Fifty
States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 382 (1984) (The trend is to minimize the
importance of marital misconduct as a factor in settlements). See also Elrod et
al., supra note 13 (describing the recent status of the law).
19. See EDWARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1975)
(illustrating a history of courtship and marriage in the United States).
20. Gary Becker has done the seminal work on the economics of family. See,
e.g., BECKER, supra note 9.
21. The female labor force participation rate has been increasing for a long
time in the United States, increasing from 15% of women aged 25-44 in 1890 to
60% by 1980. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, How WE LIVE: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICANS FROM BIRTH TO DEATH 127 (1983).
2001] 385
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women." Particularly important in this process was a decline
in the attraction of having children." Children are an
important source of the gains from specialization as they
usually force at least one parent to increase their
specialization in childcare. 4 For much of history, children
were valuable to parents, as they provided intangible
pleasure as well as labor and support in old age. In the
Twentieth Century, the value of their labor and support in old
age declined, while increased employment opportunities for
the parent who usually provided childcare (the mother)
increased the potential cost of children. Childcare
responsibilities required some combination of payments to
providers or reduced earnings for a parent. Overall, the
benefit that adults anticipated from children fell while the
cost of children increased. The result was that people elected
to have fewer children and, in some cases, they decided to
have none."
With fewer opportunities for specialization during
marriage, the gains from marriage were reduced, and the
likelihood increased that a marriage that was entered into
optimistically would turn out to be unsuccessful. In the
process of dissolving their marriage, many people concluded
that there were obvious problems with the existing fault
grounds for divorce because they were perceived to be
hypocritical and unfair. If the divorce was amiable, the
couple had to fabricate testimony to establish the fault
grounds of adultery, desertion, or cruelty. Essentially, they
had to commit perjury to obtain their divorce. If the divorce
was not amiable, the divorcing spouse had a bigger problem
since the "innocent" party had to initiate the divorce. The
result could often be a much more generous compensation
and custodial package than the divorcing spouse preferred.
22. See id. at 130.
23. Between 1800 and 1910 the fertility rate, which is the number of births
per thousand women aged 15-44, fell by more than half, and it fell by half again
during the ensuing 70 years. See id. at 17.
24. See id. at 144 (After peaking in 1957, the fertility rate has declined
dramatically.). The births per thousand population declined from 24.1 in 1950
to 14.8 in 1996. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 76 tbl.92 (118th ed.
1998).
25. For example, the percentage of households consisting of married couples
with children under 18 declined from 31% in 1980 to 25% in 1997. See id. at 62
tbl.71.
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Some people looked for easier methods for dissolving
unsuccessful marriages, thus the unilateral, no-fault divorce
resulted. Unfortunately, we moved from a "one law fits
everyone" environment based on fault to one based almost
exclusively on no-fault grounds. Many adults still wanted to
make a long-term commitment to their spouse, especially if
they wanted children, and this was frequently frustrated by
the new divorce laws. No matter the sincerity of promises
made to a spouse, there was no way to escape the fact that
the states had preempted the basis for divorce, and in most
cases they permitted unilateral divorce. It was reasonable for
many adults to respond to the statutes rather than the
promises. The need for divorce laws that could accommodate
a variety of preferences was not appreciated. In an
unfortunate leap of logic, the conclusion was that if fault
divorce was bad then no-fault divorce had to be good.
B. The Impact of No-Fault Divorce
Gradually, the initial optimism toward no-fault divorce
was tempered by the recognition of its negative
repercussions. The key impact of no-fault divorce has been a
reduction in the compensation to a divorced spouse for their
commitment to their marriage and any sacrifices that they
made for its benefit, resulting in adults making a weaker
commitment to their marriage.
1. Divorced Spouses
Initially, these concerns were addressed to divorced
women and their children. More recently other concerns
about the effect of no-fault divorce on other members of
society, especially those in intact families, have developed.
Perhaps the most striking consequence of the introduction of
no-fault divorce has been the deterioration in the financial
condition of divorced women and the children of divorced
parents. 7  The dissolution of a marriage can result in
financial arrangements to cover a property settlement,
spousal support, and child support. After the introduction of
no-fault divorce, the financial settlements received by
26. See PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 2, at 91 (discussing the
impact of no-fault divorce).
27. See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1.
20011 387
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divorced women appear to have declined substantially.28 This
is especially the case for women in marriages of long
duration.29 The smaller settlements are due to no-fault
divorce reducing the negotiating power of spouses who did not
want to dissolve their marriage. Under the fault system, the
initially unwilling plaintiffs usually were unlikely to agree to
file the suit if they did not already know the financial
outcome. The negotiations and the settlements were
essential to induce their cooperation. The fault grounds for
divorce were important for providing leverage for the initially
nonconsenting spouses, not for determining the details of
financial arrangements. The courts' role was generally only
to certify the parties' agreements.
No-fault divorce reversed the roles of the parties and the
courts. With fault divorce, there were incentives for the
couple to negotiate their own arrangements ignoring the
applicable statutes and courts.3" Alternatively, with no-fault
divorce the parties who did not want their marriage to be
dissolved had significantly less negotiating power, and in
many states a divorce could be obtained unilaterally. In
divorce litigation, the courts based settlements on the
existing laws that dictated the division of property and
alimony and child support awards.31 There was no critical
analysis of these laws during the fault divorce era because
the courts seldom applied them in controversial cases. The
28. See id. at 323.
29. More than half of the women married more than 15 years are not
awarded support. See id. at 187. Moreover, divorces are becoming more
common among long duration marriages. See Marilyn Chase, No-fault Divorce
Has a Fault of Its Own, Many Women Learn, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 18
(In 1960, only 4% of divorces involved couples married more than 15 years with
that percentage rising to 20% in 1985.). While divorces can occur for numerous
reasons, the asymmetry of the contributions of husbands and wives to marriage
can leave wives vulnerable at middle age. This occurs because the childcare
responsibilities of wives tend to occur before the prime income earning years of
the husband creating incentives for husbands to seek a divorce especially if the
costs of divorce are low. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents;
or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).
30. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 8
(1972) (explaining how divorcing couples privately agreed to an uncontested
divorce); see also 1966 CAL. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE
FAMILY 30-1 (estimating that 94% of divorce hearings in California were
uncontested).
31. Replacing the fault grounds for divorce with no-fault grounds led some
authors to conclude that family law was being privatized. See, e.g., Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1992).
388 [Vol. 41
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divorced spouse could then expect to receive half of the
limited marital property, short-term rehabilitative spousal
support, and child support if there were minor children.32 The
spousal and child support was often difficult to collect.3 The
laws governing property settlements had serious problems as
they considered only a narrow set of assets as property. 4
Most important, they ignored the spouses' income earning
capacities, which financial analysts would recognize as just as
much an asset as a car, a house, or a share of stock.35 This
omission was particularly egregious when a spouse had
reduced her future income earning capacity by limiting her
career during marriage. Recognizing the fairly predictable
outcome of litigation probably resulted in negotiated
settlements that were not substantially different from those
expected at trial. While a couple might trade off the different
components of the settlement, a spouse was not likely to
receive greater value overall than that provided by law.
While there is general agreement that women in long
duration marriages have been adversely affected by the
introduction of no-fault divorce, there has been some debate
about the magnitude of the effect. Lenore Weitzman provided
the initial evidence. In 1978, she interviewed divorced men
and women in Los Angeles County, California and concluded
that divorced men experienced an average forty-two percent
increase in their standard of living in the first year after
divorce and divorced women and their children experienced a
seventy-three percent decline.36  Other scholars have
questioned the magnitude of the impact that she observed.
Using a different data set, Saul Hoffman and Greg Duncan
found the economic status of divorced women fell an average
of approximately thirty percent in the first year after di-
32. See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 110
(property), 143 (spousal support), 262 (child support).
33. For example, in 1991 only 54% of custodial parents-mostly mothers-
even had child support awards. While some of these parents had never
married, most were either still married, divorced, or separated. Of those with
awards, three quarters received any payments at all and of those receiving
payments approximately two thirds received full payments. See LYDIA SCOON-
ROGERS & GORDON H. LESTER, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND
FATHERS: 1991 (BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Series P60-
187, 1995).
34. See Parkman, supra note 3, at 55.
35. See id. at 66.
36. See WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 323.
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vorce."7 Richard Peterson replicated Weitzman's analysis and
demonstrated that the estimates reported in her book are
inaccurate.8  Peterson's analysis, which used the same
sample and measures of economic well-being as Weitzman's
book, produced estimates of a twenty-seven percent decline in
women's standard of living and a ten percent increase in
men's standard of living after divorce." More recently,
Sanford Braver addressed some issues that the other authors
had ignored such as the effects of taxes and additional
transfers between parents to conclude that men were only
two percent better off and women one percent worse off after
a divorce. °  Certainty, we now have to conclude that
Weitzman's often-quoted numbers are probably inaccurate
and the more accurate effects may be substantial, but
smaller."'
Although less documented, no-fault divorce also has been
a disaster for numerous divorced men. Because of the
possibility of unilateral divorce, they can easily have the
marriage to which they have committed themselves dissolved
against their will. These men frequently are the primary
37. See Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the
Economic Consequences of Divorce, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485 (1985); Saul D.
Hoffman and Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?,
25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988).
38. See Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences
of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528 (1996).
39. See id. at 533. In Weitzman's response to his article, she acknowledges
that a subsequent review of her data revealed problems. See Lenore J.
Weitzman, The Economic Consequences of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment
on Peterson, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 537 (1996) The policy impact of her earlier
research was not caused by its specific statistics. For example, she over-sampled
people in longer marriages, who were more adversely affected by divorce.
Moreover, she notes that she had questioned the 73% decline in women's post
divorce standard of living, but had been reassured by her computer assistant
that the number was accurate. See id.
40. See SANFORD L. BRAVER, DIVORCED DADS 55 (1998).
41. See also H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational
Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986) (portraying
an empirical study of the impact of legal and informational constraints on the
marriage relationship); MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 4, at 260 (showing
that both fathers' and mothers' incomes, adjusted for any court awards, fell
after divorce with the income of the mothers falling substantially more than
that of the fathers).
Some scholars have questioned even the basic idea that women are actually
worse off after divorce. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 159 (1988).
However, Jacobs does not address questions that are capable of refuting
Weitzman. See PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 2, at 105.
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source of income for two households instead of one. Financial
support may be going to an ex-wife who left him for another
man with whom she is now living. In addition, child support
can be going to an ex-wife with the man essentially having no
control over how it is spent. For legal as well as practical
reasons, fathers often are given only limited access to their
children after divorce.42
2. Intact Families
A more subtle effect of no-fault divorce may be on the
quality of life for members of intact families. As noted above,
the key impact of no-fault divorce has been a reduction in the
compensation to a divorced spouse for his or her commitment
to the marriage and any sacrifices made for its benefit. The
people who traditionally made these sacrifices rationally
responded to this new environment by making a weaker
commitment and fewer sacrifices.
Marriage is expected to be an arrangement that increases
the welfare of all participants. Altruism is very important
within families. " People tend to make decisions in markets
based on narrowly defined self-interest, but the same people
tend to base their decisions within the family on altruism.
That is not to say that they are rational in one setting, but
not in the other. Relationships in markets are often
temporary. If a decision in a market confers uncompensated
benefits on a stranger, the actor is not likely to receive
anything in return.
Meanwhile, relationships within families can continue for
longer terms. Actions within families that benefit the other
members often result in the other members acting similarly
at another time. Consideration of the effects on other family
members is more likely when the persons bestowing benefits
anticipate that the other family members will reciprocate.
This is more likely to occur when marriage is a long-term
arrangement, or at least if the persons making the decisions
42. When there is a conflict in the custodial preferences of fathers and
mothers, the courts tend to respond to the mothers' preferences. See MACCOBY
& MNOOKIN, supra note 4, at 149.
43. See BECKER, supra note 9, at 277. An argument for more state control
over marriage than over other contracts is based on contracts being based on
self-interest, while marriage should be based on altruism. See Schultz, supra
note 11, at 241-42. Unappreciated are the disincentives that no-fault divorce
creates for considering the welfare of others.
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know that they will eventually be compensated for any costs
that they incur. Under those circumstances, the parties
recognize that there is a quid pro quo: they act with the
knowledge that their actions will benefit others, and they in
turn will benefit from the acts of the other members of the
family. The incentives for these activities are often the
benefits received from the other parties' activities.
If a marriage can be dissolved unilaterally without
adequate compensation, the incentive structure changes.
This is especially true if the benefits generated by the parties'
actions are not concurrent. For example, the childcare
services frequently provided by one spouse tend to occur
before the other spouse's peak earnings period. Both child
rearing and income earning confer benefits on the other
family members, but the caregiver may question whether the
marriage will continue long enough for them to receive the
external benefits produced by the other spouse's future
income and their children's love. If they do not have faith
that their marriage will continue into that period, they do not
have as strong an incentive to increase their specialization in
child rearing.
If the marriage is not viewed as a long-term
arrangement, conflicts arise between preferences of the
family and of individuals who worry about their fate if the
marriage is dissolved. Some individuals who limit their
employment opportunities may fear that they will not be
compensated for any reduction in their future earnings
(human capital) that occurs if they work only part-time, since
full-time jobs provide opportunities for on-the-job training
that are not available in part-time positions."" Spouses have
incentives to evaluate the trade-off between working at home
and at a job by considering their own welfare rather than that
of their family. Increasing work outside the home from
twenty to forty hours per week might impose more costs than
benefits on the family, so that the net benefits for the family
are negative. Conceptually, the benefits include the psychic
income from the jobs,4" but from the spouses' perspective, the
44. Firms expect to get a higher return on investments in on-the-job
training for full-time workers than for part-time workers, so they make larger
investments in full-time workers. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 30 (3d
ed. 1993).
45. Often the psychic income of employment is overestimated. As
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extra hours of employment provide them with skills that
would be beneficial if their marriage ends in divorce.
Therefore, the benefits of the jobs exceed the costs, and they
decide to work full time."
The effects of no-fault divorce are particularly apparent
with married women. On the one hand, they have been
forced to increase their emphasis on maintaining their
marketable skills during marriage, while on the other they
have felt compelled to sustain an important role in the home.
Judging by the increase in the number of hours that they
work, no-fault divorce has reduced their welfare. Victor
Fuchs found that married women are working more hours per
year after no-fault divorce than they had worked under fault
divorce, and when they work outside the home, their
responsibilities at home are not absorbed by other members
of their families.47 My research provides some additional
support that this shift in behavior by married women was a
result of the introduction of no-fault divorce." Living in a no-
fault divorce state was shown to increase the total hours
worked by married women by four and a half hours per week.
This occurred because married women in no-fault divorce
states worked on average six and a half hours more per week
outside the home while only reducing their work in the home
retirement benefits increase, many workers elect to take early retirement that
indicates that they prefer leisure to their jobs. Better-educated workers are
more likely to find interesting jobs and, therefore, work longer. See FUCHS,
supra note 21, at 160 (explaining that at ages 55-64, over 80% of men with a
college degree are still in the work force, compared with only 60% of men with
an elementary school education).
46. Although the substantial increase in the labor force participation rate of
married women is frequently attributed to financial necessity, the largest
increase in the labor force participation rate of married women has been among
those with middle to high income husbands. See Chinhui Juhn & Kevin M.
Murphy, Wage Inequality and Family Labor Supply, 15 J. LAB. & ECON. 72
(1997) (stating that these findings cast doubt on the notion that the primary
cause of the increased employment of married women has been financial
necessity).
47. See FUCHS, supra note 2, at 78. Between 1960 and 1986, women
increased the annual hours that they worked in the house and at a job by seven
percent, even as the hours spent by men in those two activities fell by the same
percent. See id. Married women increased their paid employment by 74%,
while they decreased their housework by 14% and their childcare by 26%. See
id. Over the same period, men increased their housework slightly, but they
provided even less childcare than before. Much of this shift was due to women
continuing to assume most of the responsibility for childcare. See id.
48. See Parkman, Married Women, supra note 2.
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by two hours.
3. Children
Although the discussion here has centered on adults, no-
fault divorce has also probably adversely affected the quality
of life for many children. Certainly, children can benefit from
the additional income and stimulation that come from their
parents' employment.49 This is most likely to occur when
parents place a primary importance on the welfare of their
family when making decisions. However, no-fault divorce
creates incentives for parents to interpret their self-interest
more narrowly based on their own welfare and less on the
welfare of their family. With marriage being a much more
fragile institution, there are potentially fewer rewards
associated with concern about other family members. °
Most parents are deeply concerned about the welfare of
their children, but like all choices, parenting is influenced by
its costs and benefits. When employment opportunities
outside the home were limited, and sacrificed careers were
protected to some extent by fault divorce, the cost of a parent
placing an emphasis on childcare was low. As the cost rose
because employment opportunities increased and no-fault
divorce reduced the protection for sacrificed careers, parents
became less willing to make this sacrifice. Moreover, the high
rate of marriage dissolutions increased the likelihood that
parents, and especially fathers, might eventually have a more
limited interaction with their children, thereby reducing the
benefit of parenthood.5 With higher costs and lower benefits
of parenthood, many parents have reduced their commitment
to their children. As parents spend more time at jobs, they
usually have less time to devote to their children."
49. See SUSAN CHIRA, A MOTHER'S PLACE (1998) (reviewing scientific
evidence that supports gains for children from mothers' employment). But see
JOAN K. PETERS, WHEN MOTHERS WORK (1997) (stating that mothers'
sacrificing themselves is not good for children).
50. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 2, at 78 (stating that after the introduction
of no-fault divorce, married couples increased their paid work while decreasing
their housework, but more importantly, by reducing their childcare).
51. See Margaret F. Brinig & Frank H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding
and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998) (stating that with joint
custody laws, fathers feel more involved with their children and are more likely
to meet their child support obligations).
52. Although parental involvement with their children is important,
increasingly parents are turning responsibility for childcare over to others. In
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The importance of parenting extends beyond just the
preschool years. The assistance and encouragement provided
by parents later on can be frustrated when both parents have
major obligations outside the home or when the marriage has
been dissolved. The period of increased parental employment
and marital instability has been associated with the
deterioration in the performance of children in school. 3
While no-fault divorce has reduced the attention that
children get in two-parent households, they get even less
attention if their parents are divorced. No-fault divorce has
not only made family life less stable during marriage, it has
also probably contributed to the increase in the divorce rate.54
1990, more than half of American infants were in the care of someone other
than their parents. See Shannon Brownlee et al., Culture & Ideas: Lies Parents
Tell Themselves About Why They Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12,
1997, at 58. In 1994, in families in which the mother was either employed full-
time or had more than a college education, or the family income was more than
$50,000 a year, approximately 35% of preschool children were either in
childcare or a nursery school and another 15% were being cared for by someone
other than a relative in the provider's home. See Lynne M. Casper, Who's
Minding Our Preschoolers? Fall 1994 (Update), U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P70-62, (1997).
53. Between 1967 and 1997, the average score on the verbal component of
the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) fell from 543 to 505, while the math score
fell from 516 to 511. During intervening years, these scores were even lower.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 24, at 183 tbl.290. While the increase
in single parent households has undoubtedly contributed to this trend, no-fault
divorce has probably reduced parental academic support for their children.
54. It has been difficult to test for the effect of no-fault divorce on the
divorce rate. First, no-fault divorce has taken a variety of forms from
"irretrievable breakdown" to "living separate and apart" for a specific period
creating ambiguity about how it should be specified in empirical studies.
Second, those studying the effects expect them to be lagged; and the structure of
the lagged effects is unknown. Last, since all states have had some form of no-
fault divorce for more than a decade there are no states with different laws
against which the no-fault divorce states can be compared. Any comparison
with an earlier period is forced to deal with a broad variety of others changes
that have occurred.
These problems have not deterred scholars. Gary Becker found that the
change in the grounds for divorce in California in 1970 led only to a short-term
increase in the divorce rate in that state with the rate quickly returning to its
old trend. See BECKER, supra note 9, at 334 (describing that the actual rates for
California were higher than the "trend" in 1970-1972, but they returned to the
long-term trend by 1973). In the first systematic study of the impact of no-fault
divorce on the divorce rate, Elizabeth Peters found that residence in a no-fault
divorce state in 1979 did not increase the probability that a woman would di-
vorce. See Peters, supra note 41, at 446. Doug Allen has challenged Peters's
results by questioning her designation of no-fault divorce states. See Douglas
W. Allen, Marriage and Divorce: Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 679 (1992)
(stating that by removing the influence of the regional variables used by Peters,
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Although the divorce rate rose under fault divorce, people did
not casually dissolve a marriage. There had to be a strong
sense that the marriage was failing, and at least one spouse
frequently had to make major concessions to induce the other
spouse to cooperate in a divorce. Knowing that it was going
to be difficult to dissolve their marriage, spouses had an
incentive to strive to make their marriage work. The
durability of marriage frequently worked to the benefit of
children.
No-fault divorce permits either parent to dissolve a
marriage unilaterally, potentially based on very flimsy
motives. The potential for no-fault divorce often compounds
the problems by making marriages more fragile by reducing
the spouses' commitment to their marriage in the first place.
Therefore, a marriage could be dissolved when there was still
the potential for a successful and rewarding relationship for
the entire family. Paul Amato and Alan Booth found that
between 1980 and 1992 only a minority of divorces reviewed
involved high conflict marriages.55  Not having made a
substantial commitment to their marriage, some spouses
no-fault divorce has a positive effect on the divorce rate). Using different data
than Peters and Allen, Martin Zelder concluded that no-fault divorce caused an
increase in the divorce rate. See Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolution as a
Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
503 (1993). Using still another data set, Jeffrey Gray concluded that unilateral
divorce had little effect on the probability that a couple would divorce. See
Jeffrey S. Gray, Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married
Women's Labor Supply, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 628 (1998). However, Leora
Friedberg determined that divorce rates would have been about six percent
lower if states had not adopted no-fault divorce. See Leora Friedberg, Did
Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 608 (1998). Since some states that have no-fault grounds for
divorce still consider fault in determining financial settlements, a true no-fault
divorce state would be one in which the laws governing both dissolution and the
financial settlement are no-fault. Using that definition for no-fault divorce, Peg
Brinig and Frank Buckley found that no-fault divorce was associated with
higher divorce levels. See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws
and At-Fault People, 18 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 325 (1998). See also Robert
Rowthorn, Marriage and Trust: Some Lessons from Economics, 23 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. ECON. 661 (1999) (discussing evidence on the issue). In conclusion, the
more recent evidence lends some support to the argument that no-fault divorce
has increased the divorce rate.
55. See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK 220 (1997)
(stating that only 28% of parents who divorced during the study reported any
sort of spousal physical abuse prior to divorce, 30% reported more than two
serious quarrels in the last month, and 23% reported that they disagreed "often"
or "very often" with their spouses).
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divorced after a minor provocation. Weighing the costs and
benefits of divorce might not adequately take into
consideration the impact of the divorce on any children.
While disruptive families frequently hurt children, they
are usually better off in fairly smooth functioning two parent
households than in single parent households or stepfamilies."
In single parent households, the relations between the
custodial parent, usually the mother, and her young children
are often strained after divorce." Being a single parent is a
demanding and frustrating experience. Divorced mothers,
compared with married mothers, are less affectionate with
their children, punish them more harshly, and monitor their
behavior less carefully. 8 In addition, after divorce there is a
reduction in the critical link between children and their
father.59 When a father is not present at home, his son is
twice as likely to end up in jail.60 Much of what fathers
contribute to child development is simply the result of having
a second adult in the home. Their presence is also important
because men and women have many fundamental differences
that benefit children.61 Differences have universally been
found in aggression and general activity level, cognitive skills,
sensory sensitivity, and sexual and reproductive behavior.
Conditions for children do not necessarily improve if the
56. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDERFUR, GROWING UP WITH A
SINGLE PARENT 3 (1994) (stating that an intact family can provide the child
with important social capital).
57. See E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping with Marital Transitions: A Family
Systems Perspective, in COPING WITH MARITAL TRANSITIONS: A FAMILY
SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 7 (E. Mavis Heatherington & W. Glenn Clingempeel
eds., 1992).
58. See id. at 6.
59. See DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 10 (1996) (explaining that
studies show that virtually all children clearly distinguish a mother role from a
father role); see also Paul R. Amato, Father-Child Relations, Mother-Child
Relations, and Offspring Psychological Well-being in Early Adulthood, 56 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1031 (1994) (discussing the important role of fathers in the
lives of young adults).
60. In a report presented at the 1998 American Sociological Meetings,
Cynthia Harper and Sara McLanahan found that boys whose fathers were
absent from the household had double the odds of being incarcerated, even
when other factors, such as race, income, parents' education, and urban
residence, were held constant. Boys who grew up with a stepfather had an even
higher rate of incarceration. See Boys with Absentee Dads Twice as Likely to Be
Jailed, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A3.
61. See POPENOE, supra note 59, at 139 (stating that men and women think
and act differently).
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custodial parent remarries. Children in stepfamilies are no
better off, on average, than children in divorced, single parent
families."
In summary, no-fault divorce has created incentives for
adults to be more concerned about themselves and less about
their family. The repercussions of no-fault divorce go beyond
the deteriorating conditions of divorced women and their
children. By making a long-term commitment to a marriage
less attractive, no-fault divorce has also had an adverse effect
on married couples and their children.
III. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS OF NO-FAULT GROUNDS FOR
DIVORCE
While there has been substantial criticism of the effects
of the current divorce laws, the reform of no-fault divorce
statutes has been very limited." Surveys show that roughly
half of all Americans favor changes that would make it more
difficult to get a divorce," which is a significant increase from
a decade ago. Still, it was almost thirty years after the
passage of no-fault divorce in California before states
seriously considered alternatives. In 1996, at least twenty
states considered divorce reform, including proposals in
twelve states to modify or eliminate no-fault divorce
statutes.5 The reform movement got its start in the Midwest,
where legislators in Michigan and Iowa sought to create a
divorce system that would prohibit no-fault dissolution in
cases in which one spouse contests the divorce or minor
children were involved. On Valentine's Day 1996, Michigan
State Representative Jessie Dalman launched the divorce
counter-revolution. In an announcement made on the steps of
the Michigan Capital Building, Representative Dalman
62. See MCLANAHAN & SANDERFUR, supra note 56, at 71 (stating that
remarriage of the custodial parent does not affect a child's chances of
graduating from high school or avoiding a teenage birth).
63. See Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent
Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1997)
(considering three proposals to return to consideration of fault in the divorce
process).
64. See Ann Scott Tyson, States Put Minor Speed Bumps in Divorce Path,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1 (describing how some reform
proposals include longer waiting periods and mandatory counseling).
65. See Maggie Gallagher, Time to 'fess Up to Messing Up, USA TODAY, Jan.
23, 1997, at 15A (describing how no changes had occurred in the 12 states
considering reform).
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unveiled a series of bills designed to strengthen the
institution of marriage by ending unilateral divorce." If one
spouse opposes the divorce, these bills would require proof of
fault consisting of desertion, infidelity, abuse, a prison
sentence of more than three years, alcoholism, or drug
addiction." If both the husband and wife wanted to dissolve
the marriage, the no-fault grounds would remain. However,
if children still live at home, the couple would be required to
get counseling and propose a parenting plan first. The bill
also encouraged premarital counseling by having a lower
marriage license fee and shorter waiting period for those
people who had gone through sessions with a minister,
psychologist, or family therapist.
Representative Dalman's bills were not passed and
similar bills have fared no better in other states. The first bill
to be voted on was in Washington State, which would have
permitted couples to sign a prenuptial contract excluding no-
fault divorce. 8 Common among the opponents of any change
in the no-fault divorce laws has been concern for the people
who make a mistake when they marry. For example, the
minority leader of the Washington legislature, a family
lawyer, argued that the bill might induce many couples to
sign prenuptial contracts they would later regret. Ignored is
the subtle fact that many people want, and are willing to
make, a long-term commitment to their spouse. This is not
permitted in most states under current legislation. The
Washington bill did not pass. Iowa's efforts did meet with
some success, as it passed legislation in 1996 that required
parents to take classes on how to protect their children from
the pain of divorce.69
In 1997, Louisiana became the first state to enact a major
revision of its no-fault divorce statute when it passed the
Covenant Marriage Act.70 This Act gives those planning to
66. See H.B. 4432, 88th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1995).
67. See Kenneth Cole, Bills Work Make Divorce Harder, DETROIT NEWS,
Feb. 13, 1996, at 1 (Rep. Jessie Dalman introduced an 11 bill package).
68. See id.
69. See Warren, supra note 5, at Al (describing how reformers wanted to
create three divorce options in California).
70. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-272 (West 2000); see also Nicole D. Lindsey,
Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of 'I Do," an Analysis of the Ever-Changing
Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 265 (1998) (discussing a
proposed Florida statute similar to the one enacted in Louisiana); Katherine
Shaw Spaht, Propter Honoris Prestum: For the Sake of the Children:
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marry in Louisiana a choice between two options: a standard
marriage with the potential for a no-fault divorce or a
covenant marriage.7 The covenant marriage differs from the
standard marriage in several ways. Most fundamentally,
those choosing a covenant marriage must receive counseling
prior to the wedding,7 must agree to pursue additional
counseling if the marriage encounters difficulty," and cannot
obtain a no-fault divorce without a lengthy separation.74
Under these covenant marriages the grounds for divorce are
limited. A spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a
judgment of divorce only upon proof of one of the following: (1)
the other spouse has committed adultery," (2) the other
spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to
death or imprisonment at hard labor," (3) the other spouse
has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period of one
year and constantly refuses to return,77 (4) the other spouse
has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the
divorce or a child of one of the spouses," or (5) the spouses
have been living separate and apart continuously without
reconciliation for a period of two years, if there is no
separation agreement.9
If a separation agreement has been obtained, the parties
can obtain a divorce after one year of separation if there are
no minor children," and after one year and six months of
separation if there are minor children.8' Separation
judgments can be obtained for the same fault-based reasons
as the divorce, as well as for the "habitual intemperance of
the other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages" if
such behavior is "of such a nature as to render their living
together insupportable." 2 So far, couples in Louisiana have
Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (1998).
Spaht also drafted the Louisiana Covenant Marriage law.
71. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-272 to 9-273.
72. See id. § 9-273(A)(2)(a).
73. See id.
74. See id. § 9-307.
75. See id. § 9-307(A)(1).
76. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-307(A)(2).
77. See id. § 9-307(A)(3).
78. See id. § 9-307(A)(4).
79. See id. § 9-307(A)(5).
80. See id. § 9-307(A)(6)(a).
81. See id. § 9-307(A)(6)(b).
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-307(A)(6).
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not warmly received the covenant marriage. After one year,
only one percent of Louisiana newlyweds have chosen it.83 In
1998, Arizona passed similar covenant marriage legislation.84
Meanwhile, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Virginia, Georgia, and a
handful of other states are also considering similar
legislation.
In summary, public concern about no-fault divorce has
not led to any significant reforms to date. While the
Louisiana Covenant Divorce Legislation has received
substantial publicity, it is not likely to affect many people's
behavior. Therefore, the next concern is why there has been
such a limited response.
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO REFORM
Although we have observed substantial reform activity,
there has not been much progress. A major problem with any
reform of no-fault divorce is that the conditions that led to the
shift from fault to no-fault divorce no longer exist. The
problems with fault divorce were obvious. The laws were
hypocritical, forcing people to fabricate testimony to obtain a
divorce that ended a marriage that had failed for other
reasons. People were lying to get a divorce and, to add to the
discomfort, they were lying under oath, committing perjury.
In addition, there were some very vocal advocacy groups.
Because the problems with fault divorce were obvious, no-
fault reforms had strong support among academics." In
addition, the matrimonial bar was very uncomfortable
suggesting perjury to its clients, giving it a strong impetus to
change the grounds for divorce.8" Finally, there were divorced
83. See Christine B. Whelan, No Honeymoon for Covenant Marriage, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 17, 1998, at A14 (stating that 17 states considered similar
legislation during 1998, however, only Arizona passed it into law). During the
last six months of 1998, data collected by Steve Nock, a sociologist at the
University of Virginia, indicated that the percentage of couples selecting a
covenant marriage had increased to approximately three percent. He also
determined that people in Louisiana were only gradually becoming aware of the
covenant marriage alternative. Conversation with Steve Nock, Sociologist,
University of Virginia (Feb. 22, 1999).
84. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2000).
85. See Herma Hill Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CAL.
L. REV. 1205, 1220 (1968) (describing how the matrimonial offense approach to
divorce should be modified); see also Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault
Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966) (rejecting the idea that marriage fails
because of certain specific acts).
86. See Grace Blumberg, New Models of Marriage and Divorce, in
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people, men being the most vocal, who were often unhappy
with the negotiations necessary to obtain a divorce. 7
A. Subtle Repercussions
The problem with no-fault divorce is that its
repercussions are subtle, while not being hypocritical. It is
subtle because the primary reaction has been a reduction in
the commitment by adults to their family. Few people
recognize that both parents frequently are making a major
commitment to employment, not because of dire financial
circumstances or because jobs are wonderful and fulfilling,
but because they are both concerned about their
circumstances if the marriage is dissolved. Although there is
broad concern about the state of the American family, seldom
is no-fault divorce recognized as a significant contributing
factor.8 Since no-fault divorce is effectively unilateral divorce
in most states, there is no opportunity for hypocrisy. If
someone wants out of a marriage, they do not have to
rationalize why, they just file for divorce. Without
recognition of the problem and a committed advocacy group,
the reform of no-fault divorce has not progressed very far.
Regrettably, the debate so far represents the triumph of
the obvious over the subtle. No-fault divorce is defended
because it protects people who have made a miscalculation by
marrying someone with whom they no longer want to live-
the obvious." There is concern for the unfortunate women
CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON A CHANGING
INSTITUTION 349, 352 (Kingsley Davis ed., 1985) (arguing that the primary
beneficiaries of the no-fault divorce reform were lawyers and judges who had
been forced to compromise professional ideals in the routine management of
divorce cases).
87. The concern of divorced men can be illustrated with James A. Hayes,
who was the Chairman of the California Assembly Judiciary Committee that
drafted the California no-fault divorce act. He had negotiated a divorce
settlement prior to the passage of the Act, which he eventually had modified
based on the Act and the Assembly's Report that he wrote. See PARKMAN,
GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 2, at 80.
88. For a discussion of concerns about the family, see Elizabeth Gleick,
Should This Marriage Be Saved, TIME, Feb. 27, 1995, at 48 (discussing the
problems facing the family without referring to no-fault divorce).
89. See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTz, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO
TERMS WITH AMERICA'S CHANGING FAMILIES 82 (1997) (explaining that making
divorce more difficult only exacerbates bitterness and conflict). Others argue
that no-fault divorce protects children from the mistakes of their parents,
without recognizing the benefits to children from parents having incentives to
make better decisions. See Robert M. Gordon, The Limits of Limits on Divorce,
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who would be locked into loveless marriages if the grounds for
divorce were either mutual consent or fault. However, what
is ignored because it is a great deal subtler, are the gains
from encouraging and rewarding those who have made or are
attempting to make better decisions. They want to search
diligently for the best spouse and then after marriage they
want to make the decisions that increase their own and their
family's gains from marriage. No-fault divorce does not
encourage or reward success in this process. A number of
disciplines use the term "moral hazard" to describe the
tendency of a person who buys insurance to relax his efforts
to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has insured
against." In a similar manner, no-fault divorce is a form of
insurance against bad decisions, and as a result it encourages
bad decisions.9 Since no-fault divorce, in comparison to fault
or mutual consent divorce, reduces the cost of poor judgment
when choosing a spouse, less diligent searches for spouses
would be expected and, as a consequence, poorer matches and
more divorces would result." Rather than reducing the cost
of poor decisions, this article argues that the preferred
solution would be to encourage wiser decisions.
The debate about divorce reform also represents an
unfortunate use of the English language. The problem with
current divorce laws is not that they are necessarily no-fault,
but rather that they permit unilateral divorce. In fact, it is
interesting to consider whether the divorce reforms that we
have observed over recent decades would have been as
warmly received if the proposed legislation had been called
unilateral divorce rather than no-fault divorce. If the true
problem with the current laws is that they are recognized as
permitting unilateral divorce, then the appropriate
alternative to consider is mutual consent rather than fault
divorce. Mutual consent divorce for established marriages
has a great deal more to support it than does fault divorce.
107 YALE L.J. 1435 (1998).
90. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108 (4th ed.
1992).
91. With no-fault divorce making it easy to limit the costs of poor judgment
as to a choice of a spouse, it should be no surprise that adults are less likely to
search diligently for a spouse often resulting in poor matches. See Bruno S.
Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Marriage Paradoxes, 9 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 187
(1996).
92. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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B. The Constitutional Constraint on Divorce Reform
Even if the grounds for divorce were changed in a few
states in a manner that encouraged adults to make a long-
term commitment to their marriage, the impact would be
minor at best. Lurking ominously behind even public
awareness of the problems created by no-fault divorce is
federal law that holds that a marriage is a status9" that gives
the state in which either spouse is domiciled jurisdiction to
grant a divorce, which usually will be honored in the other
states due to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.9" As a practical matter, so long as marriage is
treated as a status, the federal system in the United States
discourages states from having grounds for divorce that are
substantially stricter than those in other states.95 Although
state statutes govern divorces, reform will be hard to
accomplish on a state-by-state basis. Regulating the family is
part of the police power and has historically been confined to
the states under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.96  The federal government has only made
limited intrusions into family law. 7 For example, although
93. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). The references
here to the problems associated with marriage being treated by the courts as a
status really consist of three interrelated conflict of laws doctrines: the status
exception, the domicile rule, and the choice-of-law corollary. The status
exception compels respondents in divorce cases either to defend in states with
which they have no meaningful connection or to forfeit their right to stay
married. The domicile rule gives a state court jurisdiction only over people
domiciled within the state. Last, the choice-of-law corollary authorizes states to
apply their divorce laws to marriages with which they have no real connection.
See Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 813 (1995) (stating that the status exception should not be used to
sanction divorce or child custody proceedings in states that lack personal
jurisdiction over all interested parties); Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and
Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Wasserman, Divorce] (stating that neither the domicile rule nor its choice-of-law
corollary further the policies for which they have been defended).
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. For discussions of the jurisdictional issues in
divorce, see HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 413 (2d ed. 1974); GREGORY ET AL., supra note 6, at 189.
95. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 190
(1989) (describing how it is common for a state to grant a divorce when it does
not have jurisdiction over the couple's property or children).
96. See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the State, and not the laws of the Untied States.").
97. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1297 (1998) (challenging both the existence of an exclusively
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divorce law is a state matter, the U.S. Supreme Court has
delineated some special rules for divorce jurisdiction,
primarily to specify which divorce decrees must be afforded
full faith and credit.
When most states had similar fault grounds for divorce,
seldom was it advantageous for a spouse to move to another
state to obtain a divorce. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
was unwilling to give, full faith and credit to a divorce
obtained by a spouse in a proceeding in which the other
spouse, who was domiciled in another state, did not
participate. In 1905, the Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of migratory divorce in Haddock v. Haddock." In that
case, a couple was married in New York in 1868 and never
lived together.99  Eventually, the husband moved to
Connecticut. 1°' In 1881, he obtained a divorce in that state
based on constructive, but not actual, service of process on his
wife, who continued to live in New York and who never
appeared in the Connecticut action.' In 1899, the wife sued
for divorce in New York and obtained personal service on her
husband in that state.0 2 In his defense, the husband pleaded
the Connecticut judgment.' The U.S. Supreme Court held
that one party to a marriage domiciled within a state did not
give the court of that state jurisdiction to render a decree of
divorce enforceable in all the other states by virtue of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution against a
nonresident who did not appear and was only constructively
serviced with notice of the pendency of the action.0 The
Court emphasized that the divorce suit was not a proceeding
in rem justifying the state court to enter a decree as to the
res, or the marriage relationship, entitled to be enforced
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state court.0 5 The
Court acknowledged that the states had an important role in
regulating marriage and the decisions in one state can
local tradition in family law and the uncritical use of historical claims in
federalism discourse).
98. 201 U.S. 562 (1905).
99. See id. at 564.
100. See id. at 565.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 564.
103. See id. at 565.
104. See Haddock, 201 U.S. at 580, 606.
105. See id. at 576.
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conflict with those in other states.06 The Court concluded,
For if it be that one government in virtue of its authority
over marriage may dissolve that tie as to citizens of
another government, other governments would have a
similar power, and hence the right of every government as
to its own citizens might be rendered nugatory by the
exercise of the power which every other government
possessed.
10 7
The trend toward migratory divorces continued,
especially as some states discovered that easy divorces and
short-term residency requirements could attract new
businesses. This trend was particularly apparent in Nevada.
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered the credit to be
given migratory divorces, and it overruled Haddock in
Williams v. North Carolina"8 ("Williams I"). The Court held
that the domicile of one or both spouses is sufficient to confer
divorce jurisdiction to a state court, stating, "each state, by
virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large
interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its
own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled
there."0 9 In this case, Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix were
initially married in North Carolina and lived with their
spouses there for more than twenty years."0 In May 1940,
they went to Las Vegas, Nevada, lived there for the statutory
minimum period of six weeks to establish a domicile in the
state, and then filed for a divorce from their spouses."' Their
spouses, who continued to live in North Carolina, did not
enter an appearance nor were they served with process in
Nevada. Publication of the summons in a Las Vegas
newspaper and mailing a copy of the summons and complaint
to the last post office address of Mrs. Hendrix's husband
served process upon him."2 A North Carolina sheriff served
Mr. Williams's wife, obviously in North Carolina, by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to her."' She
106. See id. at 573.
107. Id.
108. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
109. Id. at 299.
110. See id. at 298.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 290.
406 [Vol. 41
REFORMING DIVORCE REFORM
also did not appear at the proceeding in Nevada."4  Mr.
Williams was granted a divorce on August 26, 1940, on the
ground of extreme cruelty, and Mrs. Hendrix received hers on
October 4, 1940, on the same ground plus willful neglect.'
The couple married on the same day that Mrs. Hendrix
received her divorce."6 As husband and wife they returned to
North Carolina where they were eventually prosecuted and
convicted of bigamous cohabitation."7
In reversing this conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court
created a somewhat unique role for divorce proceedings.
While acknowledging that they are not in rem, it also
concluded that it is not a mere in personam action either
because of the states' interest in the marriage relationship.' 18
It held "that each state, by virtue of its command over its
domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of
marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage
status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other
spouse is absent.""9 It recognized the concern expressed in
Haddock that due to the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
divorces obtained without personal service would
substantially dilute the sovereignty of other states.' The
Court noted that it did not address the issue of the power of
North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to the Nevada
divorce if, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North
Carolina found that no bona fide domicile was acquired in
Nevada. 2'
This last issue was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Williams v. North Carolina'22 ("Williams II"), which
followed when the Williams were convicted again of bigamy in
North Carolina when a North Carolina court rejected
Nevada's determination that the Williams established valid
domicile in Nevada and, therefore, their divorces were not
valid in North Carolina.'23  The Court emphasized the
114. See Williams, 317 U.S. at 290.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 291.
118. See id. at 297.
119. Id. at 298.
120. See Williams, 317 U.S. at 302.
121. See id.
122. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
123. See id. at 227.
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important role of the states in the regulation of marriage by
stating:
Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not merely to the
immediate parties. It affects personal rights of the
deepest significance. It also touches basic interests of
society. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status,
every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the
effect should be the same wherever the question arises. 24
Based on this concern, the standard for what constitutes
an individual's domicile assumes a central role. The North
Carolina jury was instructed that a domicile was the place
where a person "has voluntarily fixed his abode.., not for a
mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present
intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an
indefinite or unlimited length of time."2 ' North Carolina was
not required to yield its policy toward the conditions
necessary to establish a valid domicile just because Nevada
found that petitioners were domiciled there. 26  North
Carolina was entitled to find that Mr. Williams and Mrs.
Hendrix did not acquire domiciles there, and that the court
there was without power to liberate the petitioners from the
laws of North Carolina.' 7 Not having established a domicile
in Nevada, the Court held that Mr. Williams and Mrs.
Hendrix were still domiciled in North Carolina, where they
continued to be married to others, thus making their
cohabitation bigamous.
1 28
Although there is concern with honoring divorce decrees
in jurisdictions other than the one in which they are granted,
the courts have continued to require an actual domicile in a
state as a condition necessary for a valid decree based on due
process. For example, in 1953 Mr. and Mrs. Alton lived in
Connecticut, which had the traditional fault grounds for
divorce. Mrs. Alton went to the Virgin Islands, where
incompatibility was a ground for divorce, and six weeks
residency was prima facie evidence of domicile. 29  Her
husband entered an appearance and waived service of
124. Id. at 230.
125. Id. at 236.
126. See id. at 239.
127. See id.
128. See Williams, 325 U.S. at 239.
129. See Bill No. 55, 17th Leg. Assembly of the Virgin Islands, passed May
19, 1953, approved May 29, 1953, amending Sec. 9 of the Divorce Law of 1944.
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summons.' The trial court judge asked for further proof of
domicile, which was not provided, so he denied the couple
their divorce.' On appeal, in Alton v. Alton,'31 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution... a
statute determining domicile based on a period of residency
without additional requirements that address the intent of
the parties.' Because marriage is a status, domicile
continued to be the key issue.' 5 The court concluded that
"[a]n attempt by another jurisdiction to affect the relation of a
foreign domiciliary is unconstitutional even though both
parties are in court and neither one raises the question."3 '
Moreover, "we believe it to be lack of due process for one state
to take to itself the readjustment of domestic relations
between those domiciled elsewhere.' 37
While the decisions in Williams 11 and Alton might lead
one to conclude that migratory divorces would become much
less attractive, that did not occur. As illustrated in Cooper v.
Cooper,38 state courts tended to apply a very generous
standard toward the acts and duration necessary for
establishing domicile, thereby allowing migratory divorces to
flourish. The Coopers were married in 1935 in Iowa and
continued to live in that state.9  In 1958, Hazel Cooper
obtained an Iowa decree of separate maintenance. °
Eventually, in October 1969, her husband, Dr. Raymond
Cooper, moved to Reno, Nevada, and filed for divorce there in
December 1969.1" Hazel was personally served in Iowa.' At
the end of December, she was adjudged to be in default for
not having made an appearance, and the divorce was granted
130. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 668 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot,
347 U.S. 610 (1954) (per curiam).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. U.S. CONST. art. V.
134. See Wasserman, Divorce, supra note 93 (limit the effect of Williams H by
holding that due process requires domicile only in ex parte cases).
135. See Alton, 207 F.2d at 673.
136. Id. at 677.
137. Id.
138. 217 N.W.2d 584 (Iowa 1974).
139. See id. at 585.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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to her husband.' In January 1970, Dr. Cooper returned to
Iowa and married Mary in February.4 4 In 1971, Dr. Cooper
died, and the following year Hazel commenced an action to
set aside the Nevada divorce. 4 '
To the casual observer the facts do not appear to be
substantially different from those of Mr. Williams, except
that Dr. Cooper returned to Iowa for his subsequent
marriage. Dr. Cooper made an effort to appear to be
establishing a domicile in Nevada. He attempted to secure a
license to practice anesthesiology, but was only granted one
as a general practitioner and he found employment in that
field. 46  Moreover, he established a checking account and
obtained a Nevada driver's license.4 4 However, balanced
against these actions, he never purchased property, he lived
in an apartment during his stay and he never obtained
Nevada automobile license plates.'48 He maintained his office
in Iowa primarily to collect bills, but his future wife did
administer shots to some patients when directed to by other
doctors.9 When coupled with the short duration of his stay
in Nevada, there was no compelling case that Dr. Cooper had
an intention of making Nevada his home either permanently
or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, which
Williams II appears to require for the establishment of a
domicile.' The Iowa court noted that a party seeking to
collaterally invalidate a foreign divorce decree for lack of
domiciliary jurisdiction assumed a heavy burden.' It then
placed a burden on Hazel Cooper to prove by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Dr. Cooper did not
have the requisite intent to establish a domicile in Nevada at
the time that he moved there.' With some concern for the
position in which Mary Cooper would find herself if the
divorce was invalid in Iowa, 5 ' the Iowa court held that Hazel
Cooper failed to negate the presumption of jurisdiction that
143. See id.
144. See Cooper, 217 N.W.2d at 585.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 586.
149. See id.
150. See Cooper, 217 N.W.2d at 587.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 586.
[Vol. 41410
20011 REFORMING DIVORCE REFORM 411
attends the contested divorce decree.
154
With the introduction of no-fault divorce making the
divorce laws in most states similar, the need for migratory
divorces has been reduced, along with any litigation as to
whether divorces granted to a spouse in one state should be
honored in other states. Still, the decisions in Williams I and
I and how they have been interpreted in cases like Cooper
present major problems for divorce reform. Migratory divorce
was perceived to be a problem when most states had strict
divorce laws, but a few had lenient laws. One can imagine
the problems proponents of stricter divorce laws have if most
states have lenient laws. So long as marriage is treated as a
status, this problem is almost insurmountable.
C. Full Faith and Credit
Whether marriage is a contract or a status is crucial,"'
because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV of
154. See id. at 589.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (illustrating the critical distinction between these concepts by
treating status and contract very differently). Divorce is covered under
"Jurisdiction Over Status" with the RESTATEMENT stating: "State of Domicile of
One Spouse[:] A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the
marriage of spouses one of whom is domiciled in the state." Id. § 71. The
situation is very different if the marriage is treated as a contract and the couple,
either by choice or statute, has chosen to be governed by the laws of a particular
state. RESTATEMENT § 187 says the following regarding contracts:
Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular
issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would
be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is
to the local law of the state of the chosen law.
Id. § 187.
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the U.S. Constitution, which states that "the Congress may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof,"5 ' thereby requiring states to recognize the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states. In
1790, Congress passed the Full Faith and Credit Act, which
provided methods to authenticate acts, records, and judicial
proceedings.1 7  That was followed in 1804 with an
amendment to the Act to assure authentication of non-judicial
proceedings.5 8 More recently, Congress has acted under this
Clause to emphasize specific types of state acts that should be
honored in other states. For example, in 1980, Congress
passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,' which
provides that child custody rulings that comply with the Act
in one state shall be honored by all other states. This was
followed in 1994 by similar legislation, the Full Faith and
Credit for Child Support Orders Act,' which assures that
child support orders entered in one state will be honored by
sister states, and the Safe Homes for Women Act, 6' which
provides that any protection order issued by a state will be
accorded full faith and credit in sister states.
Recently, for the first time, Congress has passed
legislation instructing states that they do not have to honor
the legal actions of other states. This occurred with the
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")')' which has two
provisions. The first provision defines "marriage" and
"spouse" under federal law to include only partners of the
opposite sex. 6' The exclusion of same-sex marriages from
federal law prevents those partners from obtaining numerous
federal benefits. The second provision of DOMA provides that
a state "shall not be required to recognize same-sex marriages
156. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The first sentence of this section provides that
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
157. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
158. See Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1739 (1994)).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
162. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1997)).
163. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997).
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performed in other states."6 The conclusion of most legal
scholars is that the DOMA will probably be declared
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause if it
is challenged in the courts.'6 ' Others have argued that it is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.66
While the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires states to give full faith and credit to each
others' judgments, the second sentence allows Congress to
prescribe the effect states must give other states' judgments
or acts. The Supreme Court has not decided the issue of
whether Congress has the power to create exceptions to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause by using the effects clause.
161
The effects clause has been interpreted as only endowing
Congress with the power to enact supplementary and
enforcing legislation.'
68
In sum, the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits
Congress from passing legislation that limits the effects of a
state's divorce decrees in other states. Therefore, so long as
marriage is treated as a status people cannot possibly know
the grounds for divorce that will be applied to their marriage
if their spouse ever wants to dissolve it, and a decree granted
in another state will probably have to be honored in all other
states.
V. OVERCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON DIVORCE
REFORM
So long as marriage is treated as a status and many
states have no-fault divorce laws, it makes it virtually
impossible for the other states to make marriage more
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1997).
165. See Heather Hamilton, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A
Critical Analysis of Its Constitutionality Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 943 (1998) (explaining that traditionally Congress's
power under Article IV has only been exercised in an affirmative manner);
James M. Patten, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: How Congress Said
"No" to Full Faith and Credit and the Constitution, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
939 (1998) (arguing that the DOMA violates the Framers' intent).
166. See Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263 (1997)
(having been written in the wake of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
167. See Patten, supra note 165, at 949.
168. See Edward Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 371, 373 (1933).
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durable by making divorce more difficult. Not knowing where
a couple will eventually reside will force many spouses to
protect themselves against a no-fault divorce even though
they either were married, or are living, in a state in which
divorce is more difficult. Frequently spouses establish
residency in a state other than the one in which they were
married. A divorce obtained in a no-fault divorce state has to
be given full faith and credit in all other states, including the
one in which the other spouse lives or the one in which they
were married. Domicile is not difficult to establish, either
due to a legitimate move or for the purpose of pursuing a
divorce. Most states impose a durational requirement
ranging from six weeks to one year to meet the domicile
requirement to file for divorce.9  The most common
durational requirement for divorce is six months.7 '
Although long delayed, there has been some movement
toward reform as noted above. Louisiana and Arizona passed
covenant marriage laws and Iowa requires parents to take
classes on how to protect their children from the pain of
divorce. 7' The primary problem with covenant marriage is
the agreement entered into in one state is not binding on the
spouses if either spouse establishes a domicile in another
state.72 The incentive for couples to make a long-term
commitment to their marriage is still severely restricted
because people do not know where they will live in the future.
A. A Framework for Divorce Reform
The first important step toward an effective reform of
divorce laws is to recognize that a marriage agreement is a
contract. This can be accomplished either judicially or
legislatively. The U.S. Supreme Court could overrule or
modify its decision in Williams I to recognize that marriage is
169. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 6, at 193.
170. The Alaskan legislature, for example, removed the residency
requirement for divorce in 1975, so their divorce statute contains no residency
requirement for a divorce uncomplicated by alimony, property division, or child
custody. See Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
171. See supra notes 70-85.
172. Some authors have questioned the constitutionality of covenant
marriage laws based on the right to marry. See Melissa Lawton, The
Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (1998)
(concluding that it is constitutional, but ineffective).
414 [Vol. 41
REFORMING DIVORCE REFORM
a contract rather than a status.173  Alternatively, Congress
could enact legislation establishing that as fact. The
enforcement of contracts, especially if they include a choice of
law provision, is usually based on the law chosen by the
parties and otherwise is determined by an interest analysis. 74
Then full faith and credit would have to be given to a
judgment based on the contract agreed to at marriage rather
than to a divorce decree obtained unilaterally in a state in
which the other spouse may never have lived. More than just
accurately reflecting the couple's situation, treating a
marriage as based on a contract would correct the problems
that have been created by treating marriage as a status.
Uncertainty about the conditions associated with dissolution
of the marriage will be reduced. This is because the
agreement entered into at the time of the marriage subject to
any mutually agreed upon modifications, will continue
throughout the duration of the marriage.75
1. Marriage as a Contract
While the term "contract" is sometimes associated with
marriage, activities before and during marriage are
traditionally not covered by contract law. Marriage is created
by an agreement similar to a contract, but once solemnized it
becomes a status controlled more by law than the preferences
of the parties.7 ' Marriage also has been described as a civil
contract to subordinate the role of religious denominations in
its formation.'77 Nevertheless, the agreement by two people to
marry includes all the elements of a contract: offer,
acceptance, and consideration. The offer and acceptance are
obvious. Both the law and marriage vows include obligations
for both parties that meet the standards for consideration.
Marriage also involves problems similar to those
173. The U.S. Supreme Court could reconcile interstate judgements law in
divorce cases to conform to the law in other contexts, which would permit states
to reject the status exception, the domicile rule, and its choice-of-law corollary.
See Wasserman, Divorce, supra note 93, at 56. Alternatively, uniform
legislation could be enacted, or Congress could enact a federal statute requiring
states to recognize the divorce decrees of other states. See id. at 57.
174. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, at §§ 186-188.
175. While their agreement could call for damages as remedy for a breach, it
is argued later that the more appropriate remedy for breach of a marital
contract should be specific performance.
176. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
177. See CLARK, supra note 94, at 31.
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addressed by contract law. Contract law traditionally has
served an important role in limiting two dangers when
exchanges occur over time: opportunism and unforeseen
contingencies. 7 ' Fundamental functions of contract law are
to deter people from behaving opportunistically to encourage
long-term investments, and to reduce the need for people to
take costly steps to protect themselves. The common law, and
more recently statutes such as the Uniform Commercial
Code, deal with unforeseen contingencies by prescribing the
elements of a commercial contract unless modified by the
parties. These types of problems also occur during marriage.
Opportunism can occur when a husband attempts to divorce a
wife after she has given him the "best years of her life." The
laws specifying the spouses' obligations at divorce deal with
unforeseen contingencies.
The creation of the marriage agreement is similar to the
requirements of a commercial contract, since the agreement
must be voluntary, and it can be annulled if the agreement of
one party was obtained by fraud or force. The parties must be
competent based on age and mental capacity to make a
socially acceptable choice. Marriage is often viewed as a
status rather than a contract because of the government's role
in establishing the terms of the marriage agreement. 9
However, governments play a major role in the contracting
parties' relationships and many other subjects of contracts.
Child labor laws, for example, limit the parties who can enter
labor contracts, and drug laws limit the subject of contracts.
In addition, there are numerous governmental
environmental, health, and safety regulations around which
parties cannot contract.
178. See POSNER, supra note 90, at 89.
179. This was clearly stated in the following passage from Maynard:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract, though founded
upon the agreement of the parties. When once formed, a relation is
created between the parties that they cannot change; and the rights
and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement, but upon
the law, statutory or common. It is an institution of society, regulated
and controlled by public authority. Legislation, therefore, affecting this
institution and annulling the relation between the parties is not within
the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States against the
impairment of contracts by state legislation.
Maynard, 125 U.S. at 198; see also GREGORY ET AL., supra note 6, at 25.
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2. Breach of a Contract
Having argued that a marriage agreement is clearly
similar to other contracts, the next issue is the preferred
outcome if one party wants to terminate a contract. Most
contracts are terminable at will subject to an award of
damages, but in a minority of cases the parties have a right to
specific performance of their agreement. 80 Similarly, two
outcomes are possible when a spouse wanted to dissolve a
marriage: liquidated damages and specific performance.
With no-fault divorce, the divorcing spouse was confronted
with liquidated damages consisting of the financial and
custodial arrangements required by law or specified by the
parties in pre- or post-marital contracts. Meanwhile, with
fault divorce, innocent spouses had a right to specific
performance of the agreement to remain married during the
joint lives of the parties. The desirability of damages or
specific performance if a party wants to terminate a contract
varies with the nature of the contract.
a. Damages
Damages are the usual remedy if a contract is breached
and are based on compensating the nonbreaching party for
any loss.'8' It is not the policy of the law to compel the
performance of contracts, but only to require each party to
choose between performing and compensating the other party
for any injury resulting from non-performance.'82 A party to a
contract who is injured by its breach is entitled to
compensation for the injury sustained and is entitled to be
placed, to the extent possible by money, in the same financial
position he would have been in if the contract had been per-
formed.'83 The usual standards for damages are the expected
gain or the loss incurred due to reliance.
180. Richard Posner identifies seven remedies for the breach of a contract:
the promisee's reliance loss, the expectation loss, liquidated damages,
consequential damages, restitution, specific performance, and a money penalty
specified in the contract or other punitive damages. See POSNER, supra note 90,
at 117.
181. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, COMMERCIAL DAMAGES (Charles L. Knapp ed.,
1998), for a more detailed discussion of damages.
182. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
462 (1897).
183. See MARTIN WEINSTEIN, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 190 (1988).
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b. Specific Performance
Specific performance is only ordered when damages are
not an adequate remedy."" This occurs when damages are
difficult or impossible to measure because of the lack of good
substitutes for the performance promised by the breaching
party. It requires the party who breaches the contract to
perform or face contempt of court. Still, it is a right rather
than a requirement, because the party who has a right to
specific performance can waive that right. The usual
incentive for waiving the right is compensation. The most
common use of specific performance occurs when the subject
of the contract is unique. A large percent of the cases involv-
ing specific performance affect real estate transactions.
However, it also can be used in suits for personal property
when the property is unique. While personal services are
often unique, the courts are less willing to apply specific
performance to contracts for personal services. When applied
to personal service contracts, specific performance is usually
in the form of injunction to stop the person from providing the
service elsewhere rather than requiring the performance of
the contracted service.
c. Welfare Enhancing Remedies
Contract remedies tend to create incentives for parties to
make decisions that increase social welfare.' When two
parties contract, it is reasonable to assume that both expect
to be better off due to the contracted transaction. Contracts
that involve future activities can be subject to unforeseen
changes. The potential for damages confronts the parties
with the option of either performing under the contract or
paying damages. If the seller's costs rise so that the buyer
can acquire the contracted goods from another source at a
lower price than the seller's costs, society is better off if the
buyer buys from the alternate source. The law requires the
seller to compensate the buyer for the difference between the
contract price and the price actually paid. Meanwhile, the
supplier has avoided incurring the higher costs of production.
The use of specific performance as the remedy for the
184. See id. at 205.
185. See POSNER, supra note 90, at 118 (stating that social welfare is
increased by inducing parties to consider the costs and benefits of their actions).
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breach of a contract for unique goods is also explained as
being based on a desire for welfare enhancing outcomes.'86
When a breach is worth more to the breaching party than
performance to the victim, specific performance creates
incentives for the parties to reach a settlement that leaves
them better off. Specific performance forces the parties to
identify their costs and benefits of non-performance. The cost
associated with nonperformance when the good is unique is
the value of the good to the buyer and the expense of finding
an alternative. This cost usually cannot be estimated by
anyone other than the parties, and they have incentives to
make that calculation to determine if there is a basis for a
negotiated settlement. Specific performance does have the
disadvantage that it can increase the cost of settlement
negotiations. These negotiations are a deadweight loss since
the cost incurred by one party does not confer a benefit on the
other.
The choice of a contract remedy often turns on a trade-off
between the potential cost of "excessive breaches" when
damages are awarded and of "excessive performance" when
specific performance is awarded.'87 Because of the legal
requirement that damages must be proven and not
speculative, the damages due to a breach can be
underestimated. With damages, the result can be breaches
when the benefits of the breach do not exceed the costs, i.e.,
excessive breaches. Alternatively, with specific performance
one party can demand the performance of the contract either
due to spite or an incorrect estimate of the outcome of
negotiations when the net benefits are negative, i.e., excessive
performance. With either remedy, the parties can avoid the
legal outcomes by negotiating their settlements.
In summary, the preferred rules will be the ones that are
more likely to produce welfare enhancing outcomes, with
damages preferred for normal transactions and specific
performance when the subject of a contract is unique. Since
the costs of dissolving a marriage tends to be unique for each
186. See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351
(1978) (stating that specific performance is based on unique and non-unique
goods); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271
(1979) (arguing for a broader application of specific performance); William
Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 299
(1985) (arguing that default rules should be based on transaction costs).
187. See Bishop, supra note 186, at 300.
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marriage, specific performance of each spouse's right to the
continuation of the marriage has strong appeal, especially for
established marriages. Because specific performance is a
right rather than an outcome, the parties have incentives to
negotiate a different outcome if the benefits of dissolution
exceed the costs.
B. Specific Performance and the Marriage Contract
Specific performance as the remedy for breach of a
marriage contract is particularly attractive because the costs
of divorce can be large and indeterminate, especially by
anyone other than the spouses. First, consider the effect of
marriage on the spouses' income earning capacities, their
human capital.'88 At marriage, individuals have already
acquired some separate property. For many people, their
most valuable asset is their human capital. The value of this
human capital is the discounted value of earnings that
reasonably can be expected in the future net of any future
investments. During marriage, human capital can increase
or decrease. If it increases, marital property is created.
Alternatively, if a spouse's human capital decreases during
marriage due to decisions by the spouses, that loss is similar
to a contribution of separate property to the marriage. Often
a couple decides that the family will benefit from one spouse
limiting her career to assume a primary role as a housewife
and mother. At divorce, this person's human capital is worth
less than if she had not limited her career.9 However, it is
difficult to determine by how much, because identifying the
career that someone would have had, if they did not have it is
mere speculation. The couple is probably in a better position
to accurately gauge the magnitude of this sacrifice than any
judge or jury would be.
The incorporation of human capital into the property
considered at divorce would still not recognize other
subjective costs due to divorce. While the knowledge that the
divorcing spouse no longer wants to live with the other spouse
might reduce that person's attraction to the divorcing spouse,
188. See Parkman, supra note 3, at 63.
189. The decision for the wife to sacrifice her human capital for the benefit of
the family can be viewed as resulting in an implied contract of indemnification
for which compensation is appropriate if the marriage is dissolved. The divorce
laws do not provide for this remedy in any systematic way.
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there is still a potential loss to that person due to the desire
for a continuing relationship with that person. Another
important source of costs for the non-divorcing spouse are
those associated with search.9 ' Both parties incurred search
costs to identify each other initially. One spouse then decides
that he or she has already found a person that he or she
prefers to the current spouse or is willing to incur additional
costs searching for a better spouse or situation. The other
spouse involuntarily must incur the cost of searching for
another mate or living situation. Often, this cost can be very
high. Finally, a major cost can occur because a divorce may
be harmful to the couple's children.' When two parents live
separately, instead of together as an intact family, the quality
of life can deteriorate for the children of those parents. If
divorce were more difficult to obtain, some parents probably
could make their marriage work and thereby provide benefits
to their children. The parent, usually the mother, who
expects custody of the children after divorce is more likely to
recognize the costs that the children will incur because they
will be less happy when they only live with her.
The costs resulting from loss of companionship, time
spent searching for a better spouse or situation, and the harm
to children are difficult to calculate and, therefore, are not
included in awards at divorce. As a result, the divorce
awards tend to underestimate the costs of divorce. When the
costs of divorce are underestimated, the probability increases
that a divorce will occur when the net benefits are negative.
These divorces reduce social welfare.
C. The Marriage Contract
The marriage contract proposed in this article begins
with the idea that for established marriages, the spouses
should have a right to specific performance of their agreement
that the marriage will continue for the duration of their lives.
Early in the marriage, no-fault divorce would still be
permitted, while extreme behavior would be the basis for a
190. See BECKER, supra note 9, at 328 (arguing that marriage is the result of
a search process during which the parties weigh the benefits and the costs of
additional search).
191. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1988) (stating that little is known about the effect of divorce on
children). Generally, children prefer an unhappy marriage to a divorce. See
WALLERSTEIN & BLAKELEE, supra note 4, at 11.
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divorce based on fault.
A very simple statute is proposed here. It prescribes only
the default grounds and financial arrangements at divorce,
while leaving couples with the opportunity to modify their
contract either before or during marriage. The statute would
also state that the couple is entering into a contract and if a
divorce action is ever initiated, the couple has chosen the laws
of the state of marriage to govern the aspects of divorce
covered by the contract. States have traditionally been
reluctant to become involved in the normal interactions
within a family, and that is a position that is supported
here.192 At the same time, the states' interest in marriage
itself has been held to be so large that the states have had the
right to control the marital status of spouses domiciled within
the state." 3 This state preemption has become increasingly
questionable. The imposition by essentially all states of a no-
fault divorce agreement on all spouses has been a disaster in
many cases, and social welfare would be improved by giving
adults more freedom to create their own marriage contracts,
while maintaining state control where it is important. The
state's role in protecting children is obvious, so it is
appropriate for states to have statutes that establish rules for
protecting children during and after a marriage. It is
important to recognize that the conditions accompanying the
dissolution of marriage have far greater affect on the quality
of the marriage than has been commonly accepted. These
conditions strongly influence the commitment that the
192. Traditionally, the American family has been viewed as the cornerstone
of our society with the result that the state legislatures and courts have been
reluctant to intervene in family affairs. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
205 (1888). Still, if a legislature wanted to intervene, its powers were viewed as
broad until 1965. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme
Court held that the Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was
unconstitutional as applied to married couples. Some authors have described
marriage as a long-term relational contract in which the parties contemplate a
long-term commitment to pursue shared goals without providing specific
standards for how those goals are to be reached. The terms for dissolving the
relationship are important in establishing the incentives for cooperation. See
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage As Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1225 (1998).
193. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 289 (1942).
Of course, the state's adoption of no-fault divorce laws can be interpreted as the
state's reversing their paternalistic position on marriage, thereby
acknowledging the right of couples to have a greater control over their own
affairs. See Haas, supra note 11, at 910.
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spouses make to their marriage.14
A basic marriage contract consisting of a combination of
no-fault, mutual consent and fault grounds for divorce will
provide a major improvement in the incentives facing adults.
At the same time, it is important to recognize the alternatives
facing adults. Incentives are central to the decisions people
make. The most desirable incentives result from people being
confronted with all the costs and benefits of their
alternatives, since many social scientists assume that people
choose alternatives that they perceive as having the largest
net benefits.195 A full consideration of the relevant costs and
benefits would contemplate not only those of the person
making the decision, but also those of the other affected
people. The preferred improvement in social welfare occurs
when people choose alternatives with the largest net benefits.
Because the current, unilateral divorce laws permit people to
ignore many of the costs of divorce, people have incentives to
make less desirable decisions during, and potentially, at the
end of marriage. The combination of divorce grounds
recommended in this article forces people to consider a fuller
range of costs and benefits associated with marriage and
divorce, thereby, creating incentives for them to make
decisions that are more likely to increase their welfare and
that of those around them.
The contract proposed here is not appropriate for all
adults. The alternatives facing adults are much more varied
than those in the past, and as a consequence, a wider variety
of relationships are appropriate. A marriage contract
continues to be the appropriate choice for people who
anticipate making sacrifices based on the expectation that a
194. Since the state controls the grounds for divorce, people who do not like
the legally prescribed ease of, and arrangements at, divorce have been forced to
turn to premarital agreements. These agreements traditionally were difficult to
enforce, but that situation has improved in the states that have passed the
UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987) [hereinafter
UPAA]. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 145 (1998). Still, premarital agreements are not attractive for most
couples because they do not have a clear idea of the range of potential future
events and the conditions that they want to attach to these events. See Gregory
S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits of Private Ordering,
73 IND. L.J. 503, 507 (1998) (concluding that premarital agreements can lead to
more egalitarian marriages).
195. See FUCHS, supra note 21.
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relationship is going to be long term. For others it may be
attractive as a form of commitment; while for some people it
may not be attractive at all. We should recognize that this is
not a contract that is appropriate for all relationships. It is
meant for the large number of people who want a long-term
relationship and who feel their relationship would be
improved by having incentives to make sacrifices that benefit
their family or evidence of a commitment.
The default financial arrangements at divorce, which
traditionally consisted of a property settlement, alimony, and
child support, should be based on "debts" incurred during
marriage."6 Choices during marriage result in obligations
that are best treated as debts. Child support can be viewed
as a debt to the child that the parents incur when they elect
to become parents. This component of the financial
arrangements should be subjected to close scrutiny by the
state, for example, by establishing minimum levels. Because
the reasons for and level of alimony are very ambiguous,"' the
primary emphasis in the financial arrangements between the
spouses at divorce should be on the property settlement. The
property settlement should be based on partnership
principles with the items being considered expanded to
include the spouse's income earning capacities (their human
capital). Couples can acquire marital property, such as
mutual fund shares, by saving. Saving is the sacrifice of
current consumption that should be treated as a debt of the
couple to the spouses as individuals if the marriage is
dissolved. Other acts such as limiting a career or providing
uncompensated educational support create a debt between
the spouses that should be recognized at divorce. When the
couple's assets, such as their human capital, cannot easily be
sold, the property distribution should be based on periodic
payments.
1. Mutual Consent Divorce
Mutual consent would be the primary ground for divorce.
196. This topic is discussed in more detail in Parkman, supra note 3, at 56.
197. See Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989);
CLARK, supra note 94, at 620; HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 404 (3d ed.
1995); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (Proposed Final Draft Part
I, Feb. 14, 1997).
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Since mutual consent gives either spouse the right to the
continuation of the marriage, it is similar to specific
performance of other types of contracts. Traditionally, the
understanding has been that when a couple marries they
were entering into an agreement that is expected to last for
the lifetime of at least one of the spouses.'98 The agreement
proposed here is for those who continue to have that
expectation. Mutual agreement of the spouses as the basis
for the dissolution of established marriages is attractive
because many of the costs of dissolution are difficult for
persons other than the spouses to estimate, and even the
spouses may find the process challenging. The opponents of
fault divorce, and more recently those who support no-fault
divorce, do not appear to have given serious consideration to
mutual consent divorce.'99 However, mutual consent is more
likely to produce welfare enhancing outcomes than either
fault or no-fault grounds.
Among those willing to consider a change, the normal
alternative to no-fault divorce is fault divorce rather than
mutual consent divorce."' 0 If we recognize that the true
problem with the current laws is that they permit unilateral
divorce, then the appropriate alternative to consider is
mutual consent divorce rather than fault divorce. Knowing
that the ground for divorce for established marriages is
mutual consent, spouses would be encouraged to make
sacrifices that benefit their marriage. However, since not all
established marriages are successful, and if a couple is
questioning the durability of their marriage, mutual consent
198. For example, the wedding vows in West Virginia include the statement
for both the bride and the groom, "to have and to hold, from this day forward,
for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and
to cherish, as long as life shall last, and thereto I pledge thee my faith." W. VA.
CODE § 48-1-12b (1998).
199. It was commonly recognized that prior to the shift from fault to no-fault
grounds for divorce, there was a conflict between the divorce law on the books,
which declared marriage indissoluble except for marital fault, and the law in
practice, which tolerated divorce by mutual consent. See Kay, supra note 15, at
297.
200. See Bradford, supra note 63 (addressing three proposals to return to
consideration of fault). But see Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a
Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 773 (1996) (concluding that fault
functions are better served by the tort and criminal laws than family law), cf.
Ira Mark EUman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719 (finding
no evidence that fault divorce could confer benefits at all).
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would increase the incentives for them to recognize and place
a value on the collective benefits and costs of marriage and,
potentially, divorce. Both benefits and costs are broad
concepts that include both financial as well as psychological
factors. Some of the costs of divorce include the effects on the
spouses' human capital as well as those associated with lost
companionship, the search for a new spouse or companions,
and the disruption in the lives of the children. These costs
can be substantial. Under mutual consent divorce, the party
who does not want the divorce would have an incentive to ask
for compensation for these costs as a basis for agreeing to the
divorce.
This point can be illustrated with two examples. A
husband, who is being asked for a divorce by his wife, may
feel that he has made only limited sacrifices for the benefit of
the family, is no longer strongly attracted to her, and can find
someone just as attractive with a limited amount of effort.
He might also conclude that any children would not be
adversely affected by a divorce. Under these circumstances,
he might be willing to reach a divorce agreement at a small
cost to his wife. Since the benefits of the divorce exceed the
costs, social welfare would be improved by permitting the
divorce. Alternatively, he may have made major sacrifices for
his family's benefit, might still be strongly attracted to his
spouse, and may feel that only a long and costly search would
find another comparable spouse or living situation. He also
might be concerned that their children would suffer from a
divorce compared with the quality of life that is possible if the
parents stay together. He might under these circumstances
ask for a level of compensation that the other spouse is
unwilling to provide. In other words, the party who wants
the divorce does not value the divorce as much as the other
spouse (and children) values the continuation of the
marriage. In this case, social welfare is improved by
continuing the marriage.
One of the attractive aspects of mutual consent divorce is
the increased likelihood that both parents will address the
costs incurred by their children due to divorce. These costs go
far beyond just maintenance, which is covered by child
support. If the divorcing spouses are forced to recognize the
full costs of their divorce, some parents might be able to make
their marriage work and thereby provide benefits to their
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children °.2 1 The parents, usually the mothers, who expect
custody of the children after divorce are most likely to
recognize the costs that the children will incur. If the
children are less happy after divorce, their attitudes will
impact the welfare of the custodial parent. These changes in
the welfare of the children and the custodial parent are a
cost. The custodial parent has incentives to take these costs
into consideration when considering whether to agree to
divorce.
Another attraction of mutual consent divorce is the
incentives it creates for couples to consider the rules that are
appropriate for their marriage. If people considering
marriage knew that mutual consent was the primary ground
for dissolving an established marriage, that knowledge might
increase the incentive for them to negotiate premarital
agreements. Neither fault divorce or no-fault divorce
provides marrying individuals with the opportunity to
construct their own grounds for the dissolution of their
marriage. With mutual consent divorce, the dissolution of
marriage would be based on the parties' criteria rather than
that of the state. Under those circumstances, the parties
might be more inclined to specify their own grounds at the
time of marriage. Some might feel that a career conflict
should be a ground for dissolution, while others might not.
Because the divorce would be based on the mutual
agreement of the spouses, the spouses could ignore the
default financial arrangements suggested above. If a spouse
expected a divorce to be extremely costly, that person could
ask for substantially more than would be provided by the
default financial arrangements. Any agreement of the
spouses should be subject to regulations that attempt to
protect the interests of any children."'
Mutual consent is not a perfect solution. It can result in
the continuation of a marriage if one party wants to ignore
203
the costs imposed on the parties by the marriage. This can
201. Under no-fault divorce, many divorces occur when there has only been a
minor discord between the spouses. See AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 55, at
220.
202. See Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1551, 1558 (1984) (finding that the principal defect of no-fault divorce
laws, that promote a clean break for the spouses, is an adequate concern for
minor children of those marriages).
203. See Bishop, supra note 186, at 300 (stating that specific performance can
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occur when a spouse who makes a decision based on spite is
opposed to a divorce under any circumstances. However,
people can be surprisingly rational even when dealing with
emotional issues such as marriage and divorce. In most
divorces, at least one spouse initially wanted the marriage to
continue, °4 but when the collective benefits of divorce exceed
the costs, social welfare is increased by divorce. Under those
circumstances, the parties have incentives to construct an
agreement that leaves them both better off. The large
number of divorces based on mutual consent under the fault
grounds illustrates the willingness of spouses to negotiate
even under trying conditions.
Although mutual consent as a basis for divorce is
unappealing to some people because it appears to lock people
into unsuccessful and potentially abusive marriages, the
provisions for no-fault and fault grounds for divorce discussed
earlier should address many of these concerns. No-fault
divorce is appropriate early in a marriage as the couple is still
evaluating each other, and fault divorce is appropriate when
extremely abusive behavior occurs. However, we need to
recognize the limited ability of mutual consent to keep an
antagonistic couple together. Either spouse can always leave
the relationship with the only restrictions being the response
of others, any financial obligations imposed by law on the
spouses to each other and their children, and of course, the
ability to marry anyone else.
2. No-fault Divorce
No-fault divorce is still attractive during the early period
of a marriage. Mutual consent divorce gives substantial
power to spouses who do not want a divorce. To limit abuse of
this power, it would appear to be attractive to permit no-fault
divorce when the potential costs of divorce are likely to be
low, as they tend to be early in a marriage and when there
are no children. Early in marriage, a couple is still involved
in an evaluation process. The gains from marriage are much
smaller today for many couples."5 Each spouse questions
result in excessive performance).
204. See WALLERSTEIN & BLAKELEE, supra note 4, at 17 (finding that one-
third of the women bitterly opposed the divorce).
205. When the opportunities available to men and women were very
different, then there were substantial gains from specialization that made most
428 [Vol. 41
REFORMING DIVORCE REFORM
whether he or she wants to make a long-term commitment to
the other party. During this period of evaluation, no-fault
divorce should continue to be the grounds for divorce.
Eventually, at least one spouse may make sacrifices
based on a long-term commitment to the marriage and then
the grounds for divorce should shift to mutual consent. These
sacrifices will usually occur because a spouse is limiting a
career or the couple is having a child. In our highly mobile
society, it is common for a couple to relocate. Frequently, in
this process a spouse is forced to relinquish a desirable job so
that the other spouse can take advantage of an employment
opportunity that appears to be in the couple's long-term best
interest."6 In addition, children usually require one parent to
adjust his or her career to assist in childcare. With these
changes in the couple's circumstances, the ground for divorce
would shift to mutual consent. Since accommodations for the
long-term benefit of the marriage may be subtle, setting a
predetermined period, such as five years, as the basis for the
shift from no-fault to mutual consent divorce would be
reasonable. The grounds for divorce are going to change
under certain circumstances, such as a relocation, a child, or
a specified time period. Recognizing this will force a couple to
reevaluate their commitment to each other. If they are
uncomfortable with the restrictions that will accompany
mutual consent divorce, they can mutually agree to maintain
no-fault grounds for divorce.
Because no-fault divorce limits the incentives for couples
to negotiate, default financial arrangements would apply to
these divorces if the couple has not agreed to alternative
arrangements. Because no-fault divorce would only be
permitted early in a marriage, the property issues should not
be complicated. The major sacrifices, such as limiting a
career due to relocation or the assumption of childcare
adults better off married. As employment opportunities have improved for
women and labor saving devices become more common in the home, some men
and women have found that they have less to gain from marriage. The reduced
gains from marriage are particularly apparent for a couple that does not want
children. For a discussion of the gains from marriage, see PARKMAN, GOOD
INTENTIONS, supra note 2, at 42.
206. Some critics of reform have suggested that the elevation of the criterion
for divorce based on children degrades couples that have either not had or are
not capable of having children. See David M. Wagner, Divorce Reform: New
Directions, CURRENT 7 (Feb. 1998) (stating that some covenant marriage
proposals would only make divorce difficult if the couple had a child).
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responsibilities, would already have shifted the grounds for
divorce to mutual consent.
Under this proposal, no-fault divorce would be limited to
the early phase of a marriage. The most persuasive defense of
no-fault grounds for divorce throughout a marriage is based
on protecting people who eventually realize that they made a
mistake in their choice of a spouse."7 Seldom is recognition
given to the benefits of mutual consent that would flow to
people willing to make a long-term commitment. Therefore,
this combination of no-fault divorce early in a marriage
followed by mutual consent appears to address both of those
concerns. We need to recognize that using no-fault divorce to
protect people from their own poor judgment is not the
proverbial "free lunch," since it imposes substantial costs on
people wanting to make a long-term commitment.
3. Fault Divorce
Fault divorce should still have a role in dissolving
marriages as well. Mutual consent can create problems when
someone is "driven out" of a marriage rather than "wanting
out." It is often difficult for anyone, including the spouses
and judges, to clearly identify fault. Being driven out of a
marriage raises concerns similar to those addressed with the
fault divorce statutes. Under fault divorce, the "guilty"
spouse did something that gave the "innocent" spouse a right
to dissolve the marriage, and the innocent spouse was driven
out of the marriage. Mutual consent would not provide a
solution for the situation in which one spouse inflicts cruelty
on the other spouse or commits adultery, and then refuses to
consent to a divorce. During the fault divorce era, courts
showed little skill, however, at making determinations in
these cases. Often the grounds given for fault divorce were
hypocritical, and the marriage had failed for other reasons."' 8
In addition, even when fault grounds could be proven, the
reasons why a marriage failed were probably a great deal
more complicated than just the acts that established fault
grounds. Still fault divorce would appear to be appropriate
when there is clear evidence of fault such as abuse of a spouse
207. See American Bar Association, Press Release, Oct. 18, 1996 (stating that
84% of family lawyers, in an A.B.A. survey, opposed rescinding no-fault
divorce).
208. See RHEINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 247.
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or any children. Because abuse is socially unacceptable
behavior and should be discouraged, it should also be the
basis for an adjustment in the default financial and custodial
arrangements at divorce.
In sum, mutual consent as the ground for the dissolution
of most marriages is not a perfect solution to problems facing
the family, but it is superior to the alternatives, especially no-
fault divorce for all marriages. No-fault divorce early in
marriages provides spouses with an opportunity to evaluate
their commitment to each other at a fairly low cost. Fault
divorce can still be appropriate when a spouse is forced out of
a marriage under extreme circumstances. The reforms
advocated here have a logical foundation and would be a
substantial improvement over current divorce laws.
However, for these reforms to be effective, marriage has to be
recognized as a contract entered into at marriage upon which
dissolution has to be based. This would overcome the current
Constitutional limits on divorce reform.
4. The Enforceability of Marriage Contracts
Our last concern is with the enforceability of a contract,
such as the one suggested here, in states other than the one
in which it was created. Until recently contracts between
spouses were seldom enforced even in the state in which they
were created."0 9 A couple of recent trends suggest that the
likelihood is increasing that states other than the marriage
state will honor these contracts.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws gives
support to the principal that the law of the state chosen by
contracting parties should be enforced.210 These laws will be
applied unless two conditions exist. The first is when the
chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties,
and there is no reasonable basis for the parties' choice. 1'
209. Since marriage itself was not treated as a contract, the only contracts
were pre- and post-marital agreements between the spouses that were severely
restricted. The states had preempted the grounds for divorce so divorce grounds
were not a legitimate subject for these contracts. Other issues have gradually
been recognized as appropriate for premarital contract under certain conditions.
Initially, these contracts addressed property at death and later property at
divorce. More recently, they have been expanded to consider alimony. See
CLARK, supra note 94, at 1-20.
210. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 187.
211. See id. § 187(2)(a).
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While an argument can be made that this requirement has
been met by the marriage state even if residency there was
brief, couples probably would be advised to more carefully
choose their marriage state even if it is a source of
inconvenience for others. That is currently not an issue
because the laws of the marriage state are not relevant if a
spouse seeks a divorce in another state.
The second is that a state can reject the law chosen by a
couple if the:
application of law of the chosen state would be contrary to
a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.212
This section would have created a major problem if only
some states had the contract proposed here and most states
had only fault divorce. If the couple attempted to enforce the
contract in a fault divorce state, the courts in that state
probably would have concluded that its concern for its
domiciliaries was a "materially greater interest" thereby
permitting it to apply its laws rather than those chosen by
the couple. The states' central role in marriage, which often
was interpreted as having precedence over the spouses'
interests, has declined dramatically over the last few decades,
as evidenced by the passage of no-fault divorce statutes. If a
state has acknowledged that its "fundamental policy" is to let
spouses dissolve their marriage unilaterally even in the face
of the opposition of their spouse, it would be hard pressed to
impose its laws on spouses who had elected to make it more
difficult to divorce. No-fault divorce is a reflection of the
state's willingness to permit couples to decide for themselves
when their marriages have failed.12
Further evidence of the decline in the paternalistic role of
states is provided by the growing willingness to give spouses
greater freedom to draft pre- and post-marital contracts.1 4
212. Id. § 187(2)(b).
213. See Haas, supra note 11, at 910.
214. See Bix, supra note 194; Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The
Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887 (1997) (suggesting that
rather than restricting these contracts steps should be taken to ensure full
knowledge and the opportunity to negotiate); Singer, supra note 31.
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Many see Posner v. Posner1 . as the turning point toward
permitting couples more flexibility in drawing up their own
marriage contracts. 16 In that case, the court upheld an award
of alimony that was prescribed in an ante-nuptial agreement.
The court acknowledged that some states were retreating
from the position that the states' interests in marriage take
precedence over the private interests of spouses. 17  In
particular, it noted the passage of no-fault divorce statutes as
a reflection of this trend."8 Subject to fair disclosure, the
court held that the ante-nuptial agreement that addressed
alimony after divorce was valid and binding. 19
The enforceability of premarital agreements became
much more predictable with the approval of the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act ("UPAA"),! 2 0 which has been
adopted by half of the states.22 ' Under the uniform act, an
agreement is unenforceable under only two sets of
circumstances: (1) if there was a lack of voluntariness.22 or (2)
the agreement was substantially unreasonable at the time of
execution and the aggrieved party did not have adequate
knowledge of the other party's financial position.2
The willingness of states to enforce contractual parties'
choice of law even as applied to marriage is reflected in a
recent Connecticut case, Elgar v. Elgar.224 In that case, the
couple was married in New York, and had signed an ante-
nuptial agreement containing a choice of law provision
specifying that the agreement was being made pursuant to
New York law and would be interpreted accordingly. 5
During the marriage, the wife remained a New York resident,
while the husband continued to reside in Connecticut, with
the two sharing time in both places. 26 When the husband
died, the wife challenged the validity and enforceability of the
215. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
216. See Haas, supra note 11, at 907; Bix, supra note 194, at 152 n.20.
217. See Posner, 233 So. 2d at 384.
218. See id. at 387.
219. See id. at 394.
220. See UPAA, supra note 194.
221. As of May 1998, 26 jurisdictions had adopted the UPAA. See id. at 78
(Supp. 1998) (listing jurisdictions).
222. See id. § 6(a)(1).
223. See id. § 6(c).
224. 679 A.2d 937 (Conn. 1996).
225. See id. at 939.
226. See id. at 940.
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agreement."' A referee concluded that under sections 187
and 201 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,228 the
parties' expressed choice of New York law was valid and
under New York law the agreement was enforceable. 29 The
trial court found that the evidence supported the referee's
findings of fact, and the conclusions of law were legally and
logically correct.2 °
That decision was upheld on appeal."' Particularly
important here is the court's consideration of the choice of law
provision based on section 187 of the Restatement. The court
took special notice of the importance of protecting the
justified expectations of the parties.2"2 It then went on to
conclude that the law selected had a substantial relationship
to the parties, and that there was a reasonable basis for their
choice. In addition, Connecticut did not have a greater
material interest in the determination of the issue than New
York, the laws of which had been chosen by the couple.
In summary, the last thirty years has not only observed a
shift from fault to no-fault grounds for divorce, but also a
reduction in the states' role in matrimonial decisions.
Couples are being permitted to include a broader range of
provisions in ante-nuptial agreements and, either through
statutes such as the UPAA or court cases, it is much more
likely that their preferences will be enforced by the courts. It
is a logical step for states to extend this trend to permit
couples to contract as to the grounds for divorce, either
227. See id. at 939.
228. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, §§ 187, 201 ("Misrepresentation,
Duress, Undue Influence and Mistake: The effect of misrepresentation, duress,
undue influence and mistake upon a contract is determined by the law selected
by application of the rules of §§ 187-188.").
229. See Elgar, 679 A.2d at 941.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 945.
232. Comment (e) to § 187 of the RESTATEMENT provides:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations
of the parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy
what will be their rights and liabilities under the contract. These
objectives may best be attained in multistate transactions by letting
the parties choose the law to govern the validity of the contract and the
rights created thereby. In this way, certainty and predictability of
result are most likely to be secured. Giving parties this power of choice
is also consistent with the fact that, in contrast to other areas of the
law, persons are free within broad limits to determine the nature of
their contractual obligations.
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through statutes or case law.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article discusses the need for a reform of earlier
divorce reform that resulted in no-fault divorce. Reform
efforts to date have not been impressive. A program is
proposed that would make mutual consent the ground for
divorce in established marriages in which at least one spouse
has made a significant sacrifice based on the expectation that
the marriage is going to last for a substantial period. Prior to
those sacrifices, no-fault divorce would be the basis for
divorce. Fault divorce would be available in extreme cases.
The impact of any reform is limited because the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution currently requires
states to honor divorces acquired in other states. This
impediment can be resolved by recognizing that a marriage
creates a contract rather than a status.
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